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Abstract
Individuals tend to discount the future, meaning they value a reward more in the
present than the same reward in the future. Research indicates there are several
consequences to the rate one discounts the future, suggesting those who value the future
more have better life outcomes. Because of the ramifications of such decisions, this
study explores the dynamic of the relationship between discounting and one’s
happiness. Participants indicated an indifference point for given present values for given
time periods in the future, using both money and periods happiness as hypothetical
rewards. These indifference points allow for the calculation of various discounting
parameters. Furthermore, the research analyzes if knowing about the positive effects of
valuing the future more affected how people made their decisions. The study also
includes a further analysis of different discounting functions, as well as proposes
functions which incorporate happiness into the model, and discusses the implications of
the different models. Although only two tests returned statistically significant results,
most measures aligned with the hypotheses.

5
HAPPINESS AND TEMPORAL DISCOUNTING
The Interplay between Happiness and Temporal Discounting
Many of life’s choices revolve around questions of time: work now and socialize
later or socialize now and work later; eat healthy now and relax later or indulge now and
workout later; browse the internet now and wake up tired or go to sleep now and wake
up rested; spend money now and budget more tightly later or save now and indulge
later. These types of decisions all largely condense to one main idea: does one do
something now that has an immediate positive consequence associated with it, or does
one engage in an activity that has a potentially larger, later reward associated with it?
Although there are evaluative decisions, such as career paths and interpersonal issues,
the day-to-day decision making largely focuses on whether or not one delays
gratification. Different people face these types of decisions differently; some tend to
prefer the instant gratification, whereas others tend to hold off for the larger reward
later.
The extent to which people prefer sooner rewards rather than later, larger
rewards reflects what is known as time preference, temporal discounting, and delay of
gratification, depending on the domain. In general, people tend to prefer sooner, smaller
rewards over the delayed rewards. The rate at which one discounts rewards over time is
known as the intertemporal discount rate (Doyle, 2013). Discount rates are typically
measured by deriving an equilibrium, or indifference point, between a smaller,
immediate reward and a later, larger reward. Then, one can calculate the rate at which
one discounts the future.
The tone of research is that the more one can opt for the later, larger reward, the
better (Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002). Often, the same holds for advice
the advice-givers in life dole out: do homework before going out, save money now for
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more money in the future, be healthy now to be healthier in the future. However, people
do not always follow such advice, and often people prefer the lesser, immediate reward
(Mischel, Ebbesen, & Zeiss, 1972). Because of the vast array of intertemporal choices
one must make, an exploration of the interplay of discounting and one’s overall wellbeing, or happiness, could provide meaningful insight into human behavior.
Many consider happiness to be the ultimate goal. The philosopher Aristotle
writes, “Happiness is something final and self-sufficient, and is the end of an action.” He
argues people strive for happiness for its own sake, because it is inherently good and
desirable. According to Schoch (2006), utilitarian philosophers Jeremy Bentham and
John Stuart Mill assert the optimal society is the one which maximizes happiness, i.e.,
creating the most happiness for the most people. Even the Declaration of Independence
(1776) cites the “pursuit of happiness” as one of the premiere rights of individuals.
Although many disagree about what truly begets happiness, the underlying theme that
happiness is good and an important, if not supreme, part of human existence is
consistent across an array of philosophies.
The following paper is an attempt to study both the psychological and economics
components of the preceding issues. Through experimental observation and
measurement of individual discount rates and levels of happiness, I examine the
underlying psychological components of temporal discounting and its relationship with
happiness, as well as incorporating that into different models of economic behavior.
Additionally, I propose a new model incorporating happiness. Specifically, I seek
answers to the following questions:
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o Research Question One: Do individuals discount periods of happiness
differently than money?
o Research Question Two: Is there a connection between the extent to which
someone discounts the future and their happiness?
o Research Question Three: Does being told about the positive effects of low
discount rates and the adverse effects of high discount rates change
individuals’ indicated temporal preferences?
o Research Question Four: How does the type of discounting model affect
the interpretations and economics importance of the results?
From here, I review the relevant literature in economics and psychology to
provide an overview of the study. In the next section, I then go further through each of
research questions, posing hypotheses when appropriate. For Research Question Four, I
also outline the economic framework and discounting functions through which I analyze
the results, as well as pose a new model for analysis. The methods section explains the
experimental procedure used to gather data, presented subsequently in the results
section. Finally, a discussion section highlights the implications of the findings of this
study, as well as faults with the study, future research, and other conclusions.
Literature Review
Classical economic thought holds that people are utility maximizers; individuals
select the array of goods and activities, known as a consumption bundle, which gives
them the greatest utility, subject to budget, time, and other constraints. Every good or
activity has some inherent value or utility tied to it, and different individuals may derive
different utilities from the same good. Thus, different people may have entirely different
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consumption bundles, yet still remain “rational,” where rationality is indicative of
choosing the consumption bundle which maximizes utility.
This paradigm also holds for choice over time. For what economists consider
rational beings, the ideal choice bundle for the present takes into account both options
available in the present and options available in the future, as well as the trade-offs
associated with each option. However, as discussed, individuals discount the future, and
thus the nominal value of the future option is typically reduced in value in the present.
Taking into considerations these discounted future values, perfectly rational consumers
maximize their utility by selecting the optimal consumption bundle, given constraints
such as income and time, as well as expectations for future income, expenditures, and
risk. Finding this optimal point indicates how much a person should consume in the
present and how much a person should save for the future, as well as play a large role in
non-fiscal decisions, such as exercising and social activities.
However, research indicates people tend to systematically deviate from the basic
model of temporal discounting in a wide variety of ways, as well more general decision
making models in economics. Kahneman and Tversky (1974) asserted people often use
heuristics, or “rules of thumb” to make decisions. They argued people can be influenced
to make decisions in certain directions based on the presentation of data. For example,
Ariely (2008) argued that many of the values we assign to different goods or experiences
are largely relative based on comparisons to other goods or experiences close in mental
proximity. Thus, people determined how much something is worth based on related (or
even unrelated) stimuli. In more concrete terms, Ariely gave an example of a restaurant
menu. People tended to avoid the most expensive item on the menu but were willing to
purchase the second most expensive. Thus, by adding a high-cost item to the menu, and
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structuring the prices such that the second most expensive item had a high profit
margin, businesses increased profits, as people bought more of the high-profit item,
even though the food had no inherently higher value; it only changed relative to the
other items on the menu. This lack of ability to assess values in absolute terms may well
impact how people view components of the consumption bundle at different points in
the future.
Prelec and Loewenstein (1991) reviewed these concepts as they apply to
discounting to identify several anomalies not predicted by the normative model. Prelec
and Loewenstein described asymmetric discounting between gains and losses, whereas
losses are devalued less over time relative to gains. The magnitude effect refers to the
tendency of individuals to discount small values more than large values. The framing
effect simply signifies the importance of the manner in which the choice is presented;
some wordings, priming effects, and other factors all play a role in how people perceive
intertemporal choices. Finally, there is a delay effect, or dynamic inconsistency, which is
explained in detail in the Review of Discounting Models section. However, none of these
are factored into traditional models of discounting.
Temporal discounting is subject to other factors as well. According to Metcalfe
and Mischel (1999), at any given time, people’s mindset falls on a spectrum of hot and
cool. Hot states are dictated by emotion and desires, whereas cold states are more
calculating, rational, and objective. The researchers found people put in a hot state
became more likely to opt for immediate gratification rather than be able to delay
gratification, indicating a higher discount rate for hot states than cool states.
Furthermore, Baumeister, Vohs, and Tice (2007) argued that self-control, and thus the
ability to discount at a low rate, is like a muscle, which can get overworked. Although
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people have the capability of strengthening their self-control, if it is overworked, they
may exhibit less self-control in the short run. This led people with a “depleted ego,” as
the researchers call it, to favor short-run decisions over choices which are better in the
long run. Finally, other researchers have examined the effects on other variables such as
age and health and those effects on discount rates (Chao, Szrek, Pereira, & Pauly, 2009).
To account for many of these effects, Fudenberg and Levine (2006) argue they
can be included in a dual-self model. They illustrate by splitting the choice into a dualself decision framework, one can account for short-sighted or impulsive actions. They
argue that there are multiple short-run selves who are interested in the present, and a
long-run self that tries to dictate the short-run selves. Thaler and Shefrin (1981) posed a
similar idea, where the long-run self is the “planner” and the short-run self is the “doer.”
In this paradigm, the effects described above influence the extent to which the short-run
self is able to execute the plan of the long-run, planning self. The short-run self usually
intends on fulfilling the long-run self’s wishes to delay gratification, but certain
influences cause a person to deviate from one’s intended path. For example, a person
may plan to go on a diet to lose weight, a plan determined by the long-run self. The short
run self wants to follow this plan. However, if the person has a stressful day, which
depletes one’s ego (Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice 2007), the myopic short run self may be
more willing to give in and eat an unhealthy dessert violating the diet. This type of effect
can be integrated into a dual-self model analyses.
Evidence also suggests discount rates vary with age. Hartwick (2012) indicated
people’s discount rate changes over time, particularly getting lower as one goes through
middle age. Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes (2002) credited this lowering of discount rates
to bequest motives, whereas Shmanske (1997) credited the accumulation of memories as
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a driving force of utility in old age, and thus one does not rely as heavily on consumption
goods for utility. These factors all play into the notion that simply comparing nominal
values of rewards over different time frames is an insufficient method of describing how
people discount the future. An area that has yet to be explored is the possible interplay
of happiness on discount rates.
Traditionally in economics, utility acts as a proxy for happiness. Goods and
activities from which people derive value and enjoy comprise positive utility, which
theoretically leads to happiness. Because money is a means for obtaining methods of
producing utility, it is often assumed that increased income leads to increased
happiness. However, research indicates this is not true.
According to Perez-Truglia (2010) and Lee (2009), people acclimate to changes
in income and other life circumstances through a phenomenon known as hedonic
adaptation. This process explains why winners of the lottery only experience elevated
happiness for brief periods of time, and after an accident, new paraplegics generally only
suffer a decrease in overall happiness for a relatively brief period of time. Eventually
both lottery winners and paraplegics regress back to their set point of happiness, despite
the objectively different circumstances.
Frank (2012) argues that an individual’s income relative to one’s peers is far more
important than absolute wealth. Furthermore, Deaton and Kahneman (2010) argue
people’s subjective well-being does not increase based on wealth past a threshold of
$75,000. Using a more advanced data set, Stevenson and Wolfers (2013) contradict
Deaton and Kahneman and state happiness does in fact increase with increases in
wealth. However, Stevenson and Wolfers assert the relationship between happiness and
wealth is logarithmic in nature. Thus, there are decreasing marginal utilities to
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increasing wealth; as income increases, each additional incremental increase in wealth
leads to a smaller increase in happiness.
Many positive psychologists argue there are other components to one’s happiness
than external circumstances. Lyobomirsky (2008) argues that there are three pieces
which make up one’s level of happiness. According to her research, ten percent of
differences in individuals’ level of happiness is accounted for by external circumstances,
fifty percent of differences is accounted for by happiness habits, i.e., the mental
strategies one uses, and forty percent of differences are determined by a set point. The
set point means simply that people are predisposed to a certain level of happiness, and
ceteris paribus some people will simply be happier than others. Fujita and Diener
(2005) also provide evidence for set-point theory, and argue the set point is partially
responsible for hedonic adaptation.
This background to the relevant issues of both happiness and discounting
establishes the foundation of my research. Given the above information, I develop my
research questions and hypotheses below.
Research question one: Do individuals discount periods of happiness
differently than money? Research has replaced money as the decision item with
other types of goods and services that produce utility. In these studies, researchers have
generally found that non-monetary incentives are discounted more steeply than dollar
values (Doyle, 2013). For example, one study found consumable goods, such as candy,
beer, and soda are discounted at a greater rate than monetary incentives (Estle, Green,
Myerson, & Holt, 2007). The same study found that people who abuse drugs discount
drugs more heavily than money as well. Odum and Rainaud (2003) found similar
results with drug-addicted individuals. That research also found, for non-drug-addicted
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people, individuals discounted food and alcohol similarly and both more so than money.
Chapman (1995) found that people discount health and money at different rates, and
although there was a low correlation between the rates, the difference in discounting
was not due to different utility functions for health and money.
Consumables are more directly transferable to pleasure and ergo happiness than
money. When one thinks of chocolate, one can more readily envision the utility received
from the chocolate, whereas the specific utility from an amount of cash is more
nebulous. Further demonstrating this idea, people tended to be happier when they
receive a material gift over money of the same value, even though the recipient could
hypothetically use the money to buy something more valuable to himself (Kube,
Marechal & Puppe, 2012). Thus, consumables are an easier transaction to happiness
than is money. The temptation is therefore greater with consumables than with money,
making it more difficult to delay gratification. Thus, the hypothesis is that periods of
happiness will be discounted more highly than money, i.e., people will delay
gratification more for money than for happiness.
Research question two: Is there a connection between the extent to
which someone discounts the future and their happiness? There are two ways
to view a potential relationship between happiness and discounting: first, happiness
affects discounting, and second, discounting affects happiness. Both perspectives are
considered for this research.
Ifcher and Zarghamee (2011) provided much of the basis for the happiness affects
discounting perspective. According to their analysis of the General Social Survey (1973,
1974, 1976) there is correlational evidence that people who agreed more with “live for
today” statements (suggesting a higher discount rate) tended to be less happy, even
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when controlled by factors such as age, gender, income, education, and health.
However, the General Social Survey only has one item for happiness and one than
appears to indicate discounting tendencies, rather than true attempts to quantify either
variable.
Ifcher and Zarghamee (2011) provided some additional evidence of the effects of
positive affect on temporal discounting, as they tested participants by inducing a
positive mood using comedy clips and found that those in the positive affect group had
lower discount rates than those in the control group. Furthermore, according to Ifcher
and Zarghamee, a study by Baumeister, Bratslavsky, and Tice (1998) found that positive
affect increased time spent studying for a test with no rewards. Additionally, Isen and
Reeve (2005) found that positive affect boosted intrinsic motivation. Furthermore,
Guven (2012) suggested that happiness affects discounting. According to that research,
individual happiness impacted economic decision-making. Through using the positive
correlation between sunshine and happiness, Guven found that when people saved more
and spent less when happier, as caused by the good weather. Furthermore, happy
people evaluated decisions more, and exhibited more self-control. However, since
Guven uses sunshine as a proxy for happiness, the research may have measured more
positive affect, or a state of mind rather than the trait of happiness into which the
current study delves.
Isen and Erez (2002) suggested people in positive moods better mustered
motivation to hold out for the larger rewards in the future. Furthermore, Tice and
Bratslavsky (2000) explained the phenomenon with the cycle that people in poor moods
give in to impulses in order to make oneself feel better; the short-term reward is an
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attempt to buoy one’s mood. These all provide evidence that when studied, there will be
a negative correlation between happiness and discount rate.
From the discounting affects happiness viewpoint, high temporal discount rates
have been linked with negative life outcomes, such as obesity (Epstein, Salvy, Carr,
Dearing, & Bickel, 2010; Sellitto, Ciaramelli, & di Pellegrino, 2011; Weller, Cook, Avsar,
& Cox, 2008), gambling (Holt, Green, & Myerson, 2003), impulsive consumer behavior
(Dittmar & Bond, 2010), drug addiction (Bickel, Koffarnus, Moody & Wilson, 2014)
drunk driving (Sloan, Eldred & Xu, 2014), as well as other health behaviors (Daugherty
& Brase, 2010). According to Chapman and Elstein (1995), some discount so heavily
they neglect to practice preventative health measures to protect against future
complications and illness. Additionally, low discounting rates have been linked with
greater savings rates (Thaler, 1994), higher SAT scores and greater amounts of
education received (Mischel, Ebbesen, & Zeiss, 1972). With these connections between
negative consequences and high rates of discounting, one could expect people who
discount the future heavily to be less happy than those who discount the future less.
The substantial evidence of positive effects of low discount rates and delaying
gratification sets the foundation for Research Question 3. Assuming the ramifications of
discounting described above affect utility, one may wonder how information about
discounting affects decision-making in terms or intertemporal choice.
Research question three: Does being told about the positive effects of
low discount rates and the adverse effects of high discount rates change
individuals’ indicated temporal preferences? Several paradigms exist to analyze
this question, often with contradictory results, i.e., in some circumstances, when
informed of possible repercussions of an action, people adhere to the prescribed advice,

16
HAPPINESS AND TEMPORAL DISCOUNTING
and in other circumstances, people tended to ignore or even do the opposite of what is
good for them. For example, financial literacy education tended to increase savings rates
(Deuflhard, Georgarakos, & Inderst, 2014; Grinstead, Mauldin, Sabia, Koonce, &
Palmer, 2011). However, encouragement efforts on the part of the government have
been largely insufficient in getting people to save an appropriate amount (Ellen, Wiener,
& Fitzgerald, 2012). Furthermore, research by Bushman (1998) indicated warning labels
on high-fat products actually increased a person’s preference for the high-fat item.
Similarly, Green and Armstrong (2012) found that disclaimers in advertising tended to
have no or an adverse effect relative to their intended purpose. Furthermore, a metaanalysis by Cox , Wogalter, Stokes, and Tipton (2012) found that of the 79 cases studied,
product warnings increased safe behavior in 53 cases, had no effect in 11 cases, and in 15
cases, the warning led to higher rates of unsafe behavior. In a different meta-analysis,
Gallagher and Updegraff (2012) found that messages stated in terms of gains
encouraged illness preventing behaviors, whereas messages framed as losses did not
have as strong of an effect. Although none of these studies explicitly address the notion
of temporal discounting, all the listed issues had a temporal dimension to them; make a
decision in the present that has the potential to impact one’s life in the future. Thus,
there is room to examine whether or not an individual knowing about the
aforementioned consequences of high discount rates will affect individuals’ indicated
preferences, even in the short run.
In the studies analyzed, people followed the intention of the information more
when the information was presented as educational rather than an attempted to change
behavior. Thus, this study addresses this research question using education rather than
persuasion as the main method of investigating potential changes. Therefore, I
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hypothesize when informed of the positive effects of being able to delay gratification and
the adverse effects of preferring immediate gratification, individuals will reduce their
discount rates.
Within this question, this study looks at an exploratory analysis of whether or not
one’s happiness affects how being told about the repercussions of discounting affects the
change in their indications about their discounting. The study investigates the
possibility that how happy one is may influence how one follows the “doing what one is
told is good for oneself” principle. Little to no research exists regarding this question,
but it is nonetheless a relationship worth exploring. A person who is more capable of
integrating information into one’s lifestyle may be more likely to be happy, as that
person may have better life outcomes than those who disregard information.
The previous three research questions all deal with overall effects of discounting.
However, there are different ways in which to measure discounting, and the model
imposed on individuals impacts the interpretations of the results. Furthermore, any
measurable effects in the previous research question begs the question of economic
significance, which lead to the final research question, which overarches the previous
three.
Research question four: How does the type of discounting model
affect the interpretations and economics importance of the results?
Review of discounting models. Theoretically, temporal decision making is
the way people value outcomes at different time horizons (Wittman & Paulus, 2009). A
temporal discount rate can be determined by finding the indifference point for a certain
immediate reward, future reward, and time frame (Critchfield & Kollins, 2001).
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However, based on the assumptions made about how people discount, different models
obtain different discounting parameters, which impact how the model predicts behavior.
There are several mathematical approaches to model temporal discounting
(Doyle, 2013). The most basic of approaches is using a constant discounting formula, in
which the rate at which one discounts is not dependent on time, modeled by the
following formula
𝑃 = 𝐹 – 𝑇𝑑

(1)

where P is the present value, F is the future value, T is the time delay, and d is the
discount rate. This model suggests that for every time period, a constant value is
subtracted from the nominal future value of the reward. Although this can be useful for
instantaneous problems, using it to model multiple time-frames does not model the data
well (Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002), as people tend not to discount at a
constant rate.
An improvement on the constant discounting function is an exponential function
(Doyle, 2013; Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002). This is modeled by the
either the function
1 𝑡
𝑃 = 𝐹∗[
]
1+𝑟

(2)

𝐹 = 𝑃 ∗ (1 + 𝑟)𝑡

(3)

or the more commonly known

where F is the future value, P is the present value, r is the discount rate, and t is the
time. This is the same type of function accountants use to estimate the future value of
assets and liabilities. This type of function suggests that individuals reduced the value of
the future value at a rate proportional to the difference in time between the present and
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the future. As time increases, the amount discounted from the future value increases,
but not as much as it does in the as the discount from the previous period; although the
rate remains the same, the nominal value associated with that rate decreases over each
additional time period. The model was proposed by Paul Samuelson, and is commonly
referred to as the discounted utility model. Although the discounted utility model has
been used to estimate discounting, it has not been confirmed by scientific research. The
model essentially states that the present value of a reward is a function of the nominal
future value (i.e., what the value of the reward would be if it were received today)
1

𝑡

multiplied by a discount factor [1+𝑟] . When r is greater than zero, the discount factor
will be a positive number less than one. Thus, as t increases, the discount factor drops
toward zero. This means the greater the time difference between the present and future
reward, the greater the difference between the present and future value. This is how
many people tend to think of discounting, and thus this model is an accessible way to
conceptualize temporal choice.
However, the discounted utility model has not been shown to exhibit all the
characteristics of individuals’ time preference. One such problem with the discounted
utility model is that the discounting parameter r gives the same amount of discounting
across different intervals of the same length. For example, an r of 0.25 indicates that an
individual would be indifferent between an immediate reward of $800 and a future
reward of $1000 delayed by one time period (for the sake of the example, consider the
time period to be one year). The same r of 0.25 would indicate that a person would be
indifferent between the reward of $800 in five periods and $1000 in six periods. Along a
similar vein, consider and individual who prefers $100 today to $105 tomorrow.
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According to the discounted utility model, the same individual would prefer the $100 in
one year to $105 in a year and one day. However, research indicates this is not true; the
person may very well reverse preferences when both options are delayed by a year.
People tend to discount the immediate future more heavily than the distant future,
relative to the discounted utility model (Thaler & Loewenstien, 1989). This is known as
dynamic inconsistency. Consequently, the discounted utility model underestimates
utility in the near future and overestimates utility in the distant future.
One function that attempts to alleviate this disparity is the hyperbolic
discounting function. In this case, the function is modeled by
𝑃=

1


(1+𝑡)

*F

(4)

where ,  are constants greater than zero. In this case, increasing  causes the discount
factor to increase toward one as  approaches infinity, whereas increasing  causes the
discount factor to decrease. Therefore, a higher  means a lower discounting rate,
whereas a higher  means a higher discounting rate. However, the  term appears twice
in the formula. The  component of (1+t) causes the discount factor to decrease as 
gets larger, whereas the  component of the exponent / causes the discount factor to
increase as  gets larger. Thus, the two uses of  in the formula to some extent
counteract each other. As stated, however, letting both ’s vary, increasing  causes the
discount factor to increase toward one, but because of the counteracting of the  in the
exponent, not as quickly as it would otherwise. As a result,  captures a more long term
effect of the discounting model, whereas  captures a more short-run perspective. This
means that influencing  has a greater effect on the value of more immediate rewards,
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compared to  which will affect the reward values in the long term. The advantage of the
hyperbolic function is that it captures individuals’ tendency to discount heavily in the
short run and less so as the later reward is moved further into the future (Frederick,
Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002).
This ability of the hyperbolic function to change discounting over separate time
horizons helps solve the problem posed earlier in which different time intervals of the
same length are preferred differently by individuals. The hyperbolic discounting
function allows for a larger discount effect in the early time periods, but one that levels
out over time. Thus, in the scenario above where an individual was indifferent between
$800 today and $1000 after one time period, they may not demonstrate the same
indifference between $800 in five time periods and $1000 in six time periods, as the
person would have using the discounted utility model.
Although the hyperbolic discounting function may be a better model for human
behavior, the function is difficult to estimate empirically because of the two parameters,
with  occurring twice. Without extremely well-constructed and multidimensional data,
the hyperbolic function is an inaccessible model for much research. Several models have
been proposed to address this. According to Frederick, Lowenstein and O’Donoghue
(2002), the Harvey model constrains  to one and lets  vary. Conversely, the
Herrnstein and Mazur model fixes the ratio / to one, and lets the other  vary,
although it is referred to as ω. Thus, the two functions are as follows:
𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑦: 𝑃 = 𝐹 ∗ (1 + 𝑡)−

(5)

𝐻𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑀𝑎𝑧𝑢𝑟: 𝑃 = 𝐹 ∗ (1 + 𝜔𝑡)−1

(6)
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One other function that mimics the effects of the hyperbolic function is the quasihyperbolic function. This function is
𝑃={

For 𝑡 = 0,
For 𝑡 > 0,

𝐹
𝐹∗∗

𝑡

(7)

where  is the immediate discounting factor, and  is the component of discounting that
is affect by time, as evident by being raised to the t power.  is shorthand for the
1

discounting factor [1+] , but is abbreviated for clarity’s sake. In the quasi-hyperbolic
discounting function, the future reward is always discounted by two factors. The 
parameter represents an immediate drop in the first period, but never changes based on
time (Meyer, 2012). The t component does change with the delay of the reward, and
thus it is more influential relative to  as t grows. Like the hyperbolic function, the
quasi-hyperbolic function addresses the problem of dynamic inconsistencies by allowing
for short and long run effects in the function but is an easier equation with which to
work for estimations, as shown in the Results section.
This data analysis of this paper strictly utilizes the discounted utility
(exponential) model and the quasi-hyperbolic. To summarize the various parameters
used, see Table 1.
Table 1
Discounting Parameters
Parameter
r
 (long-run portion)
 (short-run portion)

Model
Discounted Utility
Quasi-Hyperbolic
Quasi-Hyperbolic

Increasing the parameter value
Increases discounting of the future
Increases discounting of the future
Decreases discounting of the future
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Proposed model incorporating happiness. In addition to examining the
discounted utility model and quasi-hyperbolic model, I propose a model incorporating
happiness into the models. As hypothesized, the models integrate the idea of a negative
correlation between happiness and discounting rates. Although the research does not
(8)
create a causal link between happiness and discounting models, this model assumes that
increased levels of happiness decreases one’s discount rates. For the discounted utility
model functional form, I propose Equation 8.
𝑡
1
𝑃 = 𝐹(
)
1 + [ ∗ 𝑙𝑛(𝐻)]

(8)

In Equation 10, as before P is the present value of the reward in time period t, F is the
nominal value of the future reward, H is the individual’s level of happiness, as measured
by the Subjective Happiness Scale, and  is the coefficient of happiness, and  is the
exogenous component of discounting. The behavior of this function is explored further
in the discussion section.
For the function incorporating happiness analogous to the quasi-hyperbolic
function, I propose Equation 11.
𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑡 = 0,
𝑃={

𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑡 > 0,

𝐹
𝐹 ∗ [𝜑 +  ∗ 𝑙𝑛(𝐻)] ∗ (

1 𝑡
)
1+𝜌

(9)

The only addition this function makes to the quasi-hyperbolic function is changing  to
𝜑 +  ∗ 𝑙𝑛(𝐻), where H is again the Subjective Happiness Score, and  and  are the
analogous components to  and . Again, as H increases, what would have been the 
term increases, thereby decreasing the amount of discounting. Thus, in this function as
well, there is a negative correlation between happiness and the discount rate.
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I made the decision to include the happiness term in the formerly  parameter as
opposed to the  term because although people tend to one level of happiness, it is felt in
the short-run, and thus one’s level of happiness at any given moment is more likely to
affect the short-run component of discounting than the long-run parameter. People who
are less happy are likely more inclined to boost short term morale rather than consider
the difference between two future selves. Additionally, as the time delay increases,
uncertainty increases. People who are happy now can fairly readily predict they will be
happy in the immediate future and vice versa for those who are unhappy. However,
predicting future happiness is more difficult, simply because people do not know their
future circumstances. This uncertainty makes current happy less likely to affect future
discounting and more likely to affect the immediate discount because happiness is felt in
the present.
Given my research questions, I developed a methodology to study the dynamics
described above. I now present the survey and experimental procedure used to elicit
discount functions and allow for further analysis of my research questions.
Method
Participants
A total of 74 respondents participated in the study via an online survey provider.
Students in an Introductory to Psychology course at a small, liberal arts college enrolled
as participants in the study. Participants took part in the study in exchange for credit for
their class. No demographic information was collected.
Measures
Happiness. To assess an individual’s level of happiness, the experiment has the
participants answer the Subjective Happiness Scale. This seven point scale measures an
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individual’s “set-point” of happiness, or how happy an individual tends to be
(Lyubomirsky& Lepper, 1999) in four questions answered on a Likert scale. Because this
study is more concerned with overall happiness, the measure of happiness of interest is
the Subjective Happiness Scale, because it measures an individual’s tendencies rather
than the current state of happiness. Other measures of happiness tend to focus on an
individual’s current state, rather than the long-run characteristics of individuals. This
study is concerned with how patterns of temporal discounting and overall happiness are
related, rather than how short-run happiness affects short-run decision making. See
Appendix A for the full Subjective Happiness Scale.
Discounting. Because this study measures periods of happiness, a previously
unexplored incentive, I created a new measure to assess discounting for periods of
happiness. In order to keep the experiment consistent, I developed an analogous
measure for money. I developed a list of fifteen dollar amounts, ranging from $10 to
$1000, fifteen periods of happiness, ranging from five days to one year, and fifteen time
periods ranging from three days to two years. Using a random number generator, I
assigned the fifteen dollar amounts to the fifteen time periods twice, so as to create two
different surveys. I also randomly assigned the fifteen periods of happiness to the fifteen
time delays, again twice to create two surveys for happiness. Thus, to assess discounting,
I had four different surveys, two to measure periods of happiness and two to measure
money.
In the survey, the study posed hypothetical questions using the values obtained
from the method described above for which the participant would indicate his or her
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indifference point for a given amount of time in the future in exchange for a given value
of a reward today1. Two examples are below:
How much is the minimum you would accept in ten weeks instead of $45 today?
How much is the minimum number of days of happiness you would accept in
seven months instead of 8 days of happiness starting today?
Although 52% of studies use choice responses to elicit a participant’s discount
rate, 31% use a matching, or fill-in-the-blank procedure similar to the one described
above (Hardisty, Thompson, Krantz, & Weber, 2013). In this instance, there are two
main reasons to go with the matching design. First, because there is a manipulation,
having participants give an exact response allows for a greater opportunity to exhibit
changes in thought patterns. When confined to choices, participants may not be able to
show they have changed, simply because they so heavily preferred one option to the
other that even with the manipulation, their preference does not change (e.g. if asked to
choose between $100 today and $200 in a year, and the person strongly prefers the
$200 in a year option, a manipulation will not likely change that). Secondly, because
there are not well-established guidelines for periods of happiness discounting, having
participants give their own indifference points rather than trying to impose them on the
subjects is more likely to give meaningful results. Matching has also been found to give

Research surrounding discounting has found that there is no significant or systematic difference
between offering participants real or hypothetical rewards in temporal discounting studies (Johnson &
Bickel, 2002; Locey, Jones & Rachlin, 2011). From small to moderately large sums ($0.05 to $250),
participants in within-subjects designs picked corresponding payout schedules for both real and
hypothetical rewards. In an extension, Ifcher and Zarghamee used a method in which participants were
told one of their responses would be randomly selected. The participant would then receive their selected
preference for that item, and thus the participant should treat all items like they would be selected. A
similar methodology which has been used by Albrecht and Weber (1995), is suggested by Frederick,
Loewenstein and O’Donohue (2002) and fully explored by Hardisty, Thompson, Krantz, and Weber
(2013).
1
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fewer demand characteristics, as well as fit the hyperbolic discounting model better
(Hardisty et al., 2013). This established a baseline for comparing discount rates.
Procedure
For all hypotheses, the set of participants went through a series of tests and
manipulations. The sample participants came from Psychology 111: Introduction to
Psychology courses at the College of St. Benedict and St. John’s University. The
participants received course credit for their participation. Each participant completed
several components in order to address the research questions via an online survey.
First, the participants took the Subjective Happiness Scale. Then, the participants
read a brief explanation of temporal discounting so that they understood the
discounting exercise. The participants responded to thirty-four of these questions in the
first portion of the study. The directions informed participants that the first four items
would not be used for the study. These initial questions allowed the participant to
develop some stabilized thought process for the study. Then, the participants took either
of the two survey elements for money, followed by either of the two survey elements for
happiness. Because the software used could not randomize the survey order given other
randomization constraints, which survey the participants took was assigned based on
course instructor. See Table 2 for a further illustration of survey ordering.
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Table 2
Possible Survey Orders
Survey Orders by Instructor
Instructor 1
Instructor 2
Instructor 3
Instructor 4

Received Before Treatment
Money Survey A
Happiness Survey A
Money Survey A
Happiness Survey B
Money Survey B
Happiness Survey A
Money Survey B
Happiness Survey B

Received After Treatment
Money Survey B
Happiness Survey B
Money Survey B
Happiness Survey A
Money Survey A
Happiness Survey B
Money Survey A
Happiness Survey A

The participants then engaged in either the control portion of the survey or the
manipulation portion, decided via random assignment of the survey program used. In
the manipulation, participants read a short article on the importance of delaying
gratification. As described in the literature, being able to delay gratification is beneficial
to one’s health, relationships, as well as happiness (Ifcher & Zarghamee, 2011). This
manipulation was used to determine if people who are instructed to discount the future
less in fact discounted the future less. The control group read an article of similar length
and reading level, but of an irrelevant topic (classical conditioning). See Appendix B for
full readings.
To ensure they read their article, the instructions warned the participants that
they will have to answer questions after reading the article. After reading the article,
they filled out a question box asking them to essentially summarize the article.
Following the quiz, the participants then completed the two remaining survey
elements they had yet to complete, again first for money and secondly for periods of
happiness.
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Finally, similar to Hardisty et al. (2013), the participants briefly described their
decision making process in the previous exercise to allow for some qualitative analysis.
The insight provided in this response could play a critical role in the interpretation of
the results. Appendix B provides one example of a survey participants could receive,
although as Table 2 indicates, the question set order for different participants would
vary.
Results
Data Overview
Standard outlier analysis dictated which results I eliminated from the data set.
The method, described by Zijlstra, Ark, & Sijtsma (2007) takes the interquartile range
(the 25th percentile score subtracted from the 75th percentile score) and multiplies it by
1.5. This number is added to the third quartile (75th percentile score) to find the upper
fence and subtracted from the first quartile (25th percentile score) to find the lower
fence. Responses outside the fence are considered outliers, and are thus deleted from
the dataset and excluded from analysis.
𝑄3 + 1.5 ∗ 𝐼𝑄𝑅 = 𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐹𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒

(10)

𝑄1 − 1.5 ∗ 𝐼𝑄𝑅 = 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝐹𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒

(11)

After the outlier analysis was complete, several participants had portions of the
survey with very few or zero responses for analysis. I deleted any section (i.e., one of the
four elements of the survey) with fewer than five responses. Five is an arbitrary value
selected to avoid biasing any individual survey element score toward any one response.
This led to twelve participants being entirely removed from the study, leaving 62
participants. Some participants had all their responses deleted for either money or
happiness questions but not both. I kept those individuals in the survey but did not
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analyze their data across variables. A closer look at the individual data points indicates
that these individuals either did not understand the task at hand, or more likely, did not
take the task seriously and provided meaningless responses.
A summary of the measures can be found below. The discount rates elicited are
daily discount rates. The quasi-hyperbolic metrics fit the formula 𝑃 = 𝐹 ∗  ∗  𝑡 , where
1

𝑡

 𝑡 = [1+] . A standard  of .05 provided the benchmark for statistical significance. To
obtain  and , I ran a linear regression using the below function.
𝑃 = 𝐹∗∗

𝑡

ln(𝑃) = ln(𝐹 ∗  ∗  𝑡 )
ln(𝑃) = ln(𝐹) + ln() + ln( 𝑡 )
ln(𝑃) − ln(𝐹) = ln() + ln( 𝑡 )
P
ln ( ) = ln() + 𝑡 ∗ ln( )
F

(12)

From this point, linear regression can be used to approximate estimates for  and ,
given one already has P, F, and t.
The regression results produced a result like the following:
Table 3
Sample Participant Regression Results
Variable
Constant
Time (d)
R-Squared

B
-0.570
-0.00264

95% CI
[-1.422,.282]
[-.00559,.000]
0.239

Table 3 is the regression output for a participant for Money Survey A. This particular
participant had fourteen of the fifteen possible responses included in the data analysis.
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The time coefficient of -0.0026359 indicates that the natural logarithm of  is estimated
to be -0.0026359. Thus, the following method solves for , where x is the coefficient of
time given by the regression output.
1
ln(𝛿) = ln (
)=𝑥
1+𝜌
𝑒𝑥 = e

ln(

1
)
1+𝜌

1
1+𝜌
1
1+𝜌= 𝑥
𝑒
1
𝜌 = 𝑥−1
𝑒

𝑒𝑥 =

Using Equation 14, the -value for this participant for Money Survey A is 0.0026393.
For the  term, the regression output gives the natural logarithm of , shown in
the _cons value in the regression. Thus, simply finding e raised to the power of the
_cons value of the regression output gives the  term for an individual for a specific
survey element.
I found the exponential discount for an individual for a survey element by finding
the mean of the exponential discount rates for each survey element. This data give the
descriptive statistics found below in Table 4. The descriptive statistics are for the first
set of money and periods of happiness to which the participants responded.
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Table 4
Descriptive Statistics
Measure
Subjective Happiness
Exponential Discount Rate, Money
Quasi Hyperbolic , Money
Quasi Hyperbolic , Money
Exponential Discount Rate, Happiness
Quasi Hyperbolic , Happiness
Quasi Hyperbolic , Happiness

N
61
57
58
58
57
53
53

Minimum
2.25
.0068
-.0017
.00
.0019
-.00085
.33

Maximum
6.75
.059
.012
.90
.052
.014
.96

Mean
5.05
.023
.0028
.54
.016
.0024
.60

Std. Deviation
1.03
.014
.0024
.20
.010
.0024
.168

For subjective happiness scores, participants tested between scores of 2.25 and a
maximum of 6.75, with a mean happiness score of 5.053. A histogram of the Subjective
Happiness Scores is in Figure 1.
Figure 1

Subjective Happiness Histogram

10

Number of Particiapnts

9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

Subjective Happiness Score

In the first set of items for money the participants received, they indicated daily
exponential discount rates ranging from 0.00681 to 0.05997, with a mean discounting
rate of 0.02317. From the regression results assuming the quasi-hyperbolic function for
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the same set of money items, participants indicated  values between -0.00170 and
0.01245, with a mean of 0.00284, and  values between 0.0000 and 0.89792, with a
mean of 0.54408. In the first set of items for periods of happiness the participants
received, they indicated daily exponential discount rates ranging from 0.00191 to
0.05212, with a mean discounting rate of 0.1613. From the regression results assuming
the quasi-hyperbolic function for the same set of periods of happiness items,
participants indicated  values between -0.00085 and 0.01408, with a mean of
0.00244, and  values between 0.33230 and 0.96321, with a mean of 0.60420.
Given these overall results, I can test the specific hypotheses outlined in the
Introduction.
Research Question 1
The first test, paired t-test for differences of means, determined if a difference
exists between the extent to which people discount for periods of happiness and money.
Table 5 shows the following results. A statistically significant difference was found
between an individual’s exponential discount rate for money and for happiness, t (54) =
-3.41, p = .001. The mean difference between the discount rates (M = 0.00587, SD =
0.0125) is statistically greater than zero.
No statistically significant difference was found between an individual’s  in the
quasi-hyperbolic function for money and for happiness, t (54) = 1.24, p = .220. The
mean difference between the discount rates (M = 0.00285, SD = 0.00167) is not
statistically different from zero.
No significant difference was found between an individual’s  in the quasihyperbolic function for money and for happiness, t (54) = -1.88, p = .066. The mean
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difference between the discount rates (M = -0.0453, SD = 0.176) is not statistically
different from zero.
Table 5
Paired Samples Test
Paired Differences

t

Sig. (2-tailed)

Mean
0.00586

Std. Deviation
0.0125
3.40

0.001*

Money  - Happiness 

0.00028

0.0016

1.24

0.22

Money  - Happiness 

-0.04529

0.1757

-1.88

0.066

Money Exponential Rate r –
Happiness Exponential Rate r

An analysis of the effect size confirms the findings above. The Cohen’s d for the
exponential rate from the discounted utility model is .47, which is a medium effect size,
which the statistical significance of the test picked up. However, for the  and 
parameters from the quasi-hyperbolic discounting function, the effect sizes are .18 and
.26, which are both considered small effect sizes and would take a large degree of power
to provide statistically significant results.
Research Question 2
A Pearson correlation is the best tool to determine the relationship between a
subject’s Subjective Happiness Score and the participant’s various components of
discounting. Both base score and the natural logarithm of the subjective happiness score
were calculated against the base value of the different components of discounting. Table
6 shows the results.
None of the results presented in the table are statistically significant at any
significance level. However, all of the correlations for money, the r for periods of
happiness in both the base value and natural logarithm of happiness, and the  for the
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Table 6
Correlation Table
Money
Money
Money
Happiness Happiness Happiness
Quasi
Quasi
Quasi
Quasi
DUM
DUM
Discount Hyperbolic Hyperbolic Discount Hyperbolic Hyperbolic
Rate
Rate




Subjective
Happiness

-.0951

-.0081

.0961

-.0431

.039

-.105

Natural Log of
Subjective
Happiness

-.0961

-.0311

.1031

-.0761

-.0071

-.105

1 Results are consistent

in direction with hypotheses

natural logarithm for happiness are consistent with the predicted theory. The relatively
small correlations (ranging from -.007 to -1.05) indicate the effect size for these
correlations are quite small, and thus need a test with extremely high power to
statistically prove their correlations.
I also tested the natural logarithm and base value of happiness against the
natural logarithm of the discounting parameters but obtained smaller correlations with
smaller p-values and fewer results consistent with my hypotheses.
Research Question 3
Six independent t-tests compared the group reading the article on delay of
gratification (the treatment) and the group reading the article on classical conditioning
(the control). A significant difference between the treatment and control group was
found for the difference in  for money, t (55) = -2.40, p = .020. The reduction in
discount rate for the treatment group (M = 0.032, SD = 0.146) than for the control
group (M = -0.0617, SD = 0.138). The rest of the results are not statistically significant,
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and thus I cannot conclude the intervention impacted the participants’ discounting.
Table 7 shows these results.
Table 7
Differences between Treatment and Control Groups
Mean Difference
t
DUM r, Money
-0.00372
-1.21
0.00017
0.41
, Money
 Money
0.0934
2.40
DUM r, Happiness 0.00155
0.72
, Happiness
-0.00053
-0.99
0.0220
0.57
, Happiness
1 Result

p-value (2-tailed)
.2311
.686
.0201*
.474
.3281
.5751

is consistent with predicted direction of change

As indicated in Table 7, four of the six tests aligned with the predicted results,
including the statistically significant result for the  for money. The effect sizes for the
effects that are consistent with the predicted results are consistent with the statistical
significance of the results as well. For r for money,  for periods of happiness, and  for
periods of happiness, the Cohen’s d values are .33, .28, and .15, respectively. These again
are all relatively small effect sizes. These can be compared to the .66 effect size of the 
for money, which is a moderate effect size.
For the exploratory question of how one’s happiness affects how being told about
the effects of discounting influences one’s change in discount rates, the study used a
three-way ANOVA to determine the interaction effect. A summary of the results for each
of the six parameters is found below in Table 8. A median split of the data categorized
each participant’s happiness into either the first half of happiness score or the second
half of happiness scores. The study also tested for interactions with happiness split into
tritiles and quartiles, but the results were less cohesive and had greater p-values than for
the median split. None of the results are statistically significant.
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Table 8
Interaction of Happiness and Pre- and Post-Test Results
Category
Exponential Rate, r, Money
Exponential Rate, r, Happiness
Rho, Money
Rho, Happiness
Beta, Money
Beta, Happiness

F
0.985
0.171
0.258
0.339
2.056
2.567

p-value
0.325
0.681
0.614
0.563
0.157
0.116

These results suggest that happiness does not impact the extent to which
information changes one’s time preference.
Research Question 4
Most of the quantitative results for Research Question 4 are incorporated into the
other three research questions via the differences between the discounted utility model
and the quasi-hyperbolic model. The additional component for Research Question 4 is
for the estimated properties of the proposed discounting functions which incorporate
happiness. For the function analogous to the discounted utility model,
𝑡
1
𝑃 = 𝐹(
)
1 + [ ∗ ln(𝐻)]

(8)

the estimated regression results are
Table 9
Regression Results Predicting r from Happiness
Variable
B
.033
Constant ()
Natural Logarithm of Happiness () -0.0061
R-Squared

95% CI
[.00698,.0585]
[-.0222,.0099]
.011

For the function analogous to the quasi-hyperbolic function,

(9)
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For 𝑡 = 0,
𝑃={
For 𝑡 > 0,

𝐹
1 𝑡
𝐹 ∗ [𝜑 + 𝑘 ∗ ln(𝐻)] ∗ (
)
1+𝜌

the estimated regression results are
Table 10
Regression Results Predicting r from Happiness
Variable
B
.483
Constant ()
Natural Logarithm of Happiness () .0447
R-Squared

95% CI
[.145,.820]
[-.165,.255]
.00329

A further analysis of these regression results is found in the discussion section.
Discussion
Research Question One: Is there a connection between the extent to which
someone discounts the future and their happiness?
I first hypothesized there exists a negative correlation between one’s happiness
and the individual’s discount rate. Overall, the mean level of subjective happiness in the
study was 5.05, which is slightly higher than the average for college students found in
Lyubomirsky (1999). I did not confirm the hypothesis of a negative correlation between
discounting and happiness; none of the hypothesis tests showed statistical significance.
However, by-and-large, the theory and hypotheses predicted the signs of the
correlations. As shown in Table 2, decreasing r and  decreases the amount of
discounting, whereas increasing  decreases the amount of discounting. Thus, negative
correlations between happiness and r and , and positive correlations between
happiness and  indicate a negative correlation between discounting and happiness.
When using the straight value of subjective happiness, four of the six parameters
had signs consistent with the theory, with the quasi-hyperbolic parameters for
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happiness being the opposite of the expected sign. When I considered the natural
logarithm of subjective happiness, five of the six parameters had signs consistent with
theory, as the sign for the -value of happiness for the quasi-hyperbolic function
switched signs when I took the natural logarithm of subjective happiness and ran that
correlation with the discounting parameters. The  value for periods of happiness in the
quasi-hyperbolic function still showed a negative correlation, inconsistent with the
theory. However, as none of these results were statistically significant, I cannot conclude
there exists a relationship between happiness and the various parameters measured in
relation to discounting. Nonetheless, the consistency of the signs indicate that with a
better measure and more participants, the results may fall in accordance with the
predictions.
As discussed, according to Ifcher and Zarghamee (2011), there is reason to
believe in a negative correlation between happiness and discount rates. The lack of such
findings here could be explained by several possibilities. First, the preliminary findings
of Icher and Zarghamee were from a series of mid-1970’s surveys of the general
population. The two demographics groups differed drastically; the mean age in Icher
and Zarghamee was 44, compared to the college student in this study. As mentioned, a
plethora of different studies indicated a link between low discount rates and positive life
outcomes. It is possible that college students with low discount rates have not realized
the potential of their work; in essence, they have yet to receive the larger, latter reward.
College student with low discount rates may earn higher GPAs, save more money and
live healthier lifestyles, but to a college student, those increased outcomes may not mean
much during college, but will pay off in the future. In contrast, those in college who are
engaging in behaviors demonstrating high discount rates, such as partying,
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procrastinating on homework, etc., have not yet fully experienced the consequences of
their actions.
In the above discussion, I assumed one’s discount rate changes one’s happiness.
However, this causal link has not been established in the previous research, and only
that there exists a negative correlation between the two. One could also attempt to
explain the findings of this survey assuming happiness affects one’s discount rate, i.e.,
people who are happier tend to discount the future less. It is more difficult to see how
the demographic difference between this study and the previous research accounts for
the different results. When discounting explains happiness, it is intuitive to say that
college students are not yet reaping the rewards, whereas it is less intuitive to claim that
after college, people’s behaviors change, even if their happiness remains the same.
However, in other cited studies, researchers found a causal link between affect
and discount rates (Ifcher & Zarghamee, 2011; Baumeister, Bratslavsky, & Tice, 1998;
Isen & Erez, 2002). Although mood and happiness are related, they are not the same
construct. Thus, although the research may suggest that happiness and discounting
could be negatively correlated, it does not undermine the findings of the current
research.
Finally, there is the possibility that the measures in this study were a poor
measure of either happiness or discount rates. Because the Subjective Happiness Scale
is widely cited and used, compared to the elicitation method created for this survey, it is
unlikely the Subjective Happiness Scale caused the lack of significant correlations. A
poor elicitation method more likely produced much variation in the data, making it
difficult to obtain statistically significant results. Thus, tests should be run with proven,
more reliable measures in order to potentially gauge the parameters of discounting in a
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more accurate way. Using an open-response survey allowed individuals too much room
to interpret the question without truly thinking about the implications of their
responses. For example, when posed the question, “What is the minimum amount in
dollars you would accept in three days instead of $275 today?” five participants
responded with $400 and six responded with $500. At initial glance, these responses
seem unreasonable. Because I did not provide any incentive for people to provide
accurate responses, participants may have not put the mental effort into the question
required to find a true indifference point.
Research Question Two: Do individuals discount periods of happiness
differently than money?
The second set of hypotheses addressed the different discount rates between
money and happiness. When using the exponential functional form, I found a
statistically significant difference between the discount rate of happiness and the
discount rate of money. Unlike hypothesized, people tended to discount happiness more
than money. This is contradictory to previous research indicating consumables are
discounted more heavily than money (Doyle, 2013, Estle et al., 2007).
However, according to the quasi-hyperbolic data, no significant difference exists
between the discounting parameters,  and , for neither happiness nor discounting.
According to the  term, individuals actually had a steeper constant discounting factor
for money than happiness, the opposite of expected. The mean difference of -0.0453
indicates that for any given amount of money, they will discount the future value of it by
4.53 percent less than if the reward were in terms of length of happiness, all else being
equal. Although neither result showed statistically significance, the relatively low p-
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values suggest with more refined measures and greater sample sizes, the effect could
become more apparent.
Based on the assumption that happiness is more like a consumable than money,
this seems counterintuitive. One may expect consumables to have a high initial
discounting constant in order to overcome natural desires such as hunger, pleasure, etc.
In this way, happiness may fundamentally differ from consumables in that way.
Another possible explanation for the contradiction to the predicted results is the
magnitude effect explained previously. People tend to discount small amounts more
heavily than large amounts (Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991). For example, a person may
prefer $1 today to $2 in a week, but would prefer $200 in a week to $100 today. This
reversal of preference based on magnitude is not predicted by the models used, and
could have affect the results. The monetary values used were between $10 and $1000,
compared to the periods of happiness of three days to two years. These ranges may not
translate; participants perceived they would get a greater magnitude of utility from the
values used for days of happiness than the values of money. This discrepancy between
the values may have led to the appearance that people were discounting money more
heavily than periods of happiness. If the magnitudes of the utilities between money and
periods of happiness were more comparable, the results may have been different and
confirmed theory.
Because of the abstract nature of comparing periods of happiness to money, it is
difficult to interpret what differences in discounting may truly mean beyond a simple
analysis of the data. The disparity between money and happiness for the exponential
function is easily mirrored to the consumable goods mentioned before; the more direct
the route to pleasure, the greater a reward is discounted in the future. Thus, people want
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the immediate gratification the more easily the good is transferable into pleasure.
However, with the quasi-hyperbolic data, this analysis appears flawed, as the immediate
discounting constant is greater for periods of happiness, meaning it is discounted less.
However, recognizing there are different discounting parameters for different
types of goods has market implications. For example, consider ordering a good from
online retailers. Often, people can find better deals online, even when shipping is
included. Despite the better price, many people purchase goods they could buy cheaper
online in stores. Part of this is likely explained by different types of discounting. Some
goods are discounted more heavily than others, and some may have greater initial
discounting constants, whereas others may have greater time dependent parameters.
Based on the variation of these parameters, how a consumer decides to purchase a good
may shift with different shipping times and prices.
Furthermore, knowing how people discount different types of goods is an
important component of setting prices. There are often a couple options when choosing
shipping methods. A typical array would be one day shipping, two to three business
days, or five to seven business days. The more quickly one receives their order (or
reward) the more the customer will have to pay. Each of these scenarios provides a
present value based on the discounting function, and thus the type of function and the
parameters within the function matter tremendously as far as to whether or not a person
purchases a good in store or via the internet. Even beyond the decisions college students
make about when to do various activities such as saving money (Khwaja, Silverman,
Sloan, & Wang, 2007) or exercising (Moreland, 2013) people make decisions based on
temporal discounting. An extreme example is winning the lottery; winners of large
jackpots often get to choose between a lump sum immediately and a larger amount paid
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out over time. The research (Ifcher & Zarghamee, 2011) indicates that not only is it
smarter fiscally to make the decision to receive the money over time, but it will allow for
greater happiness through more aggregate consumption. In a more accessible realm,
employees of a company often receive equity in the company, sometimes in the form of
restricted stock: a certain number of shares that after a certain period of time and or
conditions are met, vests into full value shares. In this case, the employee is receiving
compensation at a delayed rate. The extent to which the employee (or company) would
trade off the shares for an increase in salary is partially an exercise in temporal
discounting. Thus, how readily money and other goods or experiences transfer into
happiness affect the extent to which they are discounted, which may help explain crossdomain inconsistencies.
Research Question Three: Does being told about the positive effects of low
discount rates and the adverse effects of high discount rates change
individuals’ indicated temporal preferences?
I also hypothesized that reading a brief article highlighting the importance of
delaying gratification (i.e., having a low discount rate) would decrease people’s discount
parameters. In all but one of the t-tests, the statistics did not confirm this hypothesis.
For the  value for money, there existed a statistically significant difference between the
treatment and control group, indicating that reading the article on the importance of
delay of gratification decreased one’s discount rate more than reading a neutral article.
However, none of the other t-tests were statistically significant. Nonetheless,
theory predicted the direction of change for all but one test. The hypothesis predicted
the difference in exponential rates, r, to be greater in the treatment group than in the
control group. The analysis shows the opposite; those in the treatment group increased
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their discounting rates while those in the control decreased theirs. Only one of the six
tests, though, had that result.
This has encouraging implications for policy makers and influencers who hope to
educate people to make more long-run oriented decisions. The results for the  value for
money suggest that when people are educated about the consequences of having a high
discount rate and the benefits to having a lower discount rate, they are able to discount
less, specifically in the short-term. This indicates that the education effect has an
immediate impact and can bolster one’s short-term will to delay gratification. However,
the education does not necessarily impact the long run decisions people make.
Therefore, someone may change their behavior for choices between today and tomorrow
than two future dates or today and a date far off in the future. People may be more easily
swayed to not spend in the short-run, but an individual’s long run planning appears less
susceptible to education. For example, education could play impact someone’s decisionmaking when shopping for luxury items such as clothes or entertainment devices; they
can be persuaded to delay gratification and save that money for a future date. However,
according to the results, education is less likely to impact schedules of payment for
loans. Because all the dates of payment are in the future, the  term does not affect the
differences in those time horizons. Thus, education on delaying gratification would not
impact the types of payment programs people would choose for loans.
Similarly, the tests for interactions did not yield any statistically significant
results. Two of the six cases changed in a direction that indicated happy people are more
likely to incorporate new information into their decision process (the  for periods of
happiness and amounts of money), whereas the other four cases indicated that unhappy
people are more likely to incorporate new information into their decision process.

46
HAPPINESS AND TEMPORAL DISCOUNTING
Because of the ambiguity of these results, I am unable to derive any meaningful theory
from them, aside from one’s level of happiness does not interact with how well one
incorporates potentially consequential evidence into one’s life.
Again, because of the lack of statistically significant results, there are several
possibilities. As discussed previously, the measure may not have been sensitive enough
to detect changes in small variables. Increased sensitivity and improvement of the
elicitation method could help reduce this. Additionally, the information may not have
been strong or persuasive enough to impact an individual’s time preference, or at least
enough to register as statistically significant.
However, it is also possible that the results are true; informing someone of the
importance of delaying gratification does not affect their discount rate. If this is the case,
then people are not adopting behaviors that potentially could have large positive
repercussions. As discussed previously, several studies and meta-analyses show
scenarios in which people do not adopt new behaviors or attitudes based on warning or
education.
Knowing this allows for the inclusion of the dual-self concept. According to
Thaler and Shefrin (1981), people have a “planner” and “doer” self. The planner tries to
account for the myopic tendencies of the doer, who ultimately makes decisions in the
moment. Knowing the doer tends to be short-sighted, the planner may set up rules or
contingencies to help the doer make more long-term oriented decisions. For example,
economics professors at Yale started a business called “stickK.” This website and app
helps own lose weight by making the person commit to giving money to a charity or
organization (sometimes one to which they would particularly hate donating money) if
the person does not attain their weight loss goals. Thus, the planner is making the active
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decision to put in place a contingency the doer self must consider when thinking about
working out or eating unhealthy food. The planner knows the myopic doer will tend to
opt for immediate gratification, but that immediate gratification is not in line with the
planner’s long term goals. In this scenario, clearly the planner knows the tendencies of
the doer, and that left to the doers’ own choosing, the person will suffer in the long run,
so by putting in an enforcing mechanism, the doer chooses the route the planner
intends. Therefore, it follows that informing people about the consequences of high
discount rates will not change the doers’ time preferences; both the planner and the
doer already know the benefits of being able to delay gratification. That leaves the
planner to create contingencies like stickK to moderate the behavior of the doer.
According to Laibson (1997), this sort of analysis can be solved mathematically, given
the dual-self model and the ability to follow commitment mechanisms to give more
predictable results than strictly the discounting models, specifically the quasi-hyperbolic
model, alone.
As individuals and as a society people need to decide if this is acceptable or not.
Many behavioral economists have studied the effects of “nudges” that help improve
individual decision making by providing a framework in which people tend to follow the
decision framework a “choice architect” sets up (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). For
important life decisions, such as savings, health choices, and other questions of delaying
gratification, there may be significant room for improvement based on the principles of
the nudge. Some may impose such commitment plans upon themselves, and others may
choose not to do so. Some feel policy makers should utilize such concepts to guide
individuals toward socially optimal outcomes. Thus, it is up for society and individuals
to decide if they want to subject themselves to a system where the individual’s actions
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are guided toward what some would consider a desirable result or if choice should
remain uninhibited. Research by Choi (2010) lauds the success of automatic enrollment
for 401k retirement plans, which has led to higher enrollments in savings plans.
However, some consider mechanisms like default enrollment and other covert nudges
manipulative and are opposed to their implementation (Felsen, Castelo, & Reiner, 2013)
The discussion of this notion is beyond the scope of the paper, but the results do seem to
indicate that there is room for improvement beyond simple education.
Despite the general trend of statistically insignificant results, there is still room to
interpret the data under different models. Furthermore, the economics significance of
the statistically non-significant results still has relevant applications.
Research Question Four: How does the type of discounting model affect the
interpretations and implications of the results?
The mean discount rate for money of 0.02318 implies that the average person
would be indifferent between $100 today, $107.06 in three days, $117.24 in one week,
$197.75 in thirty days, and $773.26 in ninety days. The mean quasi-hyperbolic function
for money implies the average person would be indifferent between $100 today,
$182.20 in three days, $196.67 in thirty days, and $234.22in ninety days. For the
happiness exponential function, the data suggest the average person would be
indifferent between 100 days of happiness starting today and 104.9 days of happiness
starting in three days, 111.9 days of happiness starting in seven days, 161.7 days of
happiness starting in thirty days, and 422.4 days of happiness starting in ninety days.
The quasi-hyperbolic function for happiness suggests that the average person would be
indifferent between 100 days of happiness starting today and 168.1 days of happiness
starting in three days, 169.8 days of happiness starting in 7 days, 179.7 days of happiness
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starting in thirty days and 208.4 days of happiness starting in ninety days. Appendix D
has a full tabulation of these data.
When one uses the function incorporating one’s level of happiness, some
interesting results occur. Although Appendix D has the full data results, the Figure 2
demonstrates the differences between different levels of happiness and indifference
points. Using Equation 8 for the discounted utility model and Equation 9 for the quasihyperbolic model (reshown below)
𝑡
1
𝑃 = 𝐹(
)
1 + [ ∗ 𝑙𝑛(𝐻)]

𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑡 = 0,
𝑃={

𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑡 > 0,

(8)

𝐹
1 𝑡
𝐹 ∗ [𝜑 +  ∗ 𝑙𝑛(𝐻)] ∗ (
)
1+𝜌

(9)

I can model the indifference curves for various time delays for different levels of
happiness, given an amount to be received today. The new model allows deviations in
happiness to change the amount of discounting that occurs.
At small time frames, the indifference points between levels of happiness are
fairly close to each other. A happy person (Subjective Happiness Scale score of 6.5) is
indifferent between$100 today and $106.52 in three days, whereas a person at the
average level of happiness (Subjective Happiness Scale score of 5.05) is indifferent
between$100 today and $107.00 in three days, and an unhappy person (Subjective
Happiness Scale Score of 3) is indifferent between$100 today and $108.01 in three days.
However, as one extends the time period out to ninety days, the indifference point for
$100 today is $664.54 for the happy person, $761.46 for the person with an average
level of happiness, and $1,007.77 for an unhappy person. Thus, as the delay gets larger,
the effect of happiness is exacerbated given this functional form.
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Simply looking at the graph for the two types of functions, as well as
comparatively for the different levels of happiness, illustrates the distinctions between
the quasi-hyperbolic and discounted utility model. The discounted utility model starts
off increasing slowly, followed by rapidly increasing rates as time increases. The quasihyperbolic, however, starts with an initially large leap from the $100 today to $181.15 at
day one, but the increase over time is much more tempered than in the discounted
utility model. This effect causes the quasi-hyperbolic function to overestimate
discounting in the short-run and underestimate it in the long run, whereas the
discounted utility model underestimates discounting in the initial periods and grossly
overestimates discounting in the further out periods. More mathematically
sophisticated models could alleviate this problem. Nevertheless, the two discounting
functions provide a solid basis and framework to analyze discounting.
One can compare these effects to what happens in the quasi-hyperbolic model
when one incorporates happiness. For $100 today, using the quasi-hyperbolic function
taking into account percentile of happiness, the happy person is indifferent for $178.16
in three days, a person with average happiness is indifferent for $181.26, and an
unhappy person is indifferent for $189.73. For the same $100 today, but in ninety days,
the happy person is indifferent for $229.03, the average person, $233.68, and someone
who is unhappy is indifferent for $243.91. As opposed to the discounted utility model, in
the quasi-hyperbolic model incorporating happiness, the relative differences between
people at different levels of happiness stays the same as time goes on.
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Figure 2
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This is because the function is constructed in a way where happiness only affects the
first time period’s decision process, and all subsequent time periods are discounted the
same amount.
Another way to analyze this data is to generate a consumption over time function.
In a method outlined by Silberberg (1978), one can determine optimal consumption at a
given time C(t) given an initial capital stock Ko, income flow iK, utility function U(C), a
consumption span T, and a discounting function. For this analysis, I let the discounting
function be 𝑚𝑡 where 𝑚 =

1
1+𝑟

𝑜𝑟

1
1+[∗𝑙𝑛(𝐻)]

depending on whether or not the analysis

is using the function incorporating happiness. In this method, one maximizes the
function
𝑇

∫ 𝑈(𝐶(𝑡)) ∗ 𝑚𝑡 𝑑𝑡
0

𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝐾 ′ = 𝑖𝐾 − 𝐶, 𝐾(0) = 𝐾0 , 𝐾(𝑇) ≥ 0

(15)

This maximizes utility as a function of consumption with a discounting factor, given that
one has an initial capital stock which can receive interest, at the rate of income flow
minus consumption. According to Kahneman and Krueger (2006), there are
diminishing marginal returns to overall consumption, so I let U(C) = ln(C), a function
which exhibits that behavior. I solve this method using the Hamiltonian maximization
technique fully in Appendix C. There, I show the solution to be:
𝐶(𝑡) = −

𝐾0 ln(𝑚) 𝑒 𝑖𝑡 𝑚𝑡
1 − 𝑚𝑇

(16)

Thus, by imposing parameters into the function, one can map out consumption over
time. Although one could easily use this sort of analysis for consumption over one’s life,
I restrict the time-frame to a more narrow range. The data collected looks at daily
discount rates over a relatively short period of time (two years), and thus if the data
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collected is imposed onto an entire life, the results become extreme and difficult to
interpret. For exploration, consider this scenario. Two parents go on month long
vacation, and leave their 22 year old son home with $1000 to survive, which they put in
a bank account that earns 0.1% interest daily. The son wants to spend all the money
available by the time his parents return. The son has the discount function of the same
form and with the same parameters as elicited through the data collection in the
preceding experiment, and wants to maximize utility. The graph on the following page
(Figure 3) illustrates the son’s consumption over time given different discounting
functions. An exact tabulation of the data can be found in Appendix F
From the table, one can see the effects of the various factors influencing discount
rates. For the elicited discounting function based on the average discount rates of the
participants, the average participant in the circumstances described above would
consume $41.98 on the first day. The average person would then decrease consumption
slightly each day over the month until finishing the month by consuming $35.26 on the
final day. My proposed model which integrates happiness into the function aligns very
closely with the average elicited discounting function, starting at $41.95 on the first day
and ending at $35.29. According to my model, a happy person starts the month
consuming $41.45 and finishes at $35.75, whereas an unhappy person starts the month
consuming $42.99 and ends the month spending $34.34.
The specific values of this exercise are less important than the behavior of the
different functions. As stated, a person with an “average” score on the Subjective
Happiness Scale should have a very similar consumption curve to the average elicited
discounting function. Because the person discounts the future, the person starts off
consuming more at the beginning of the time period and ends the month spending less,

54
HAPPINESS AND TEMPORAL DISCOUNTING
assuming the individual’s discount rate is greater than the interest rate they could
receive on the money.
Comparatively, a happier person will have a flatter consumption pattern than the
average person, because a happier person values the future more relative to an unhappy
person, according to the model. Thus, in order to maximize utility, the person consumes
more relative to the unhappy person at the later dates, leading to the more even
consumption pattern. Nonetheless, the happy person still does discount the future and
therefore consumes more at the beginning than at the end of the time period.
Conversely, an unhappy person has a steeper consumption pattern because the unhappy
person values the present more than the future, relative to the happy person.
In the above example, the economic significance of the difference between the
happy and unhappy person appears negligible. The unhappy person starts the month
spending $1.54 more and ends the month spending $1.41 less than the happy person.
This spending behavior would not likely lead to noticeably different behavior patterns to
a casual observer or even to the consumers themselves. However, as one extends the
model further into time, the difference between happy and unhappy consumers
expands. The exact point at which these disparities become economically significant is
open to interpretation, but knowing the overall trends of the model proves useful for
making such determinations.

55
HAPPINESS AND TEMPORAL DISCOUNTING
Figure 3

Consumption Over Time

44

Elicited Discounted Utility Model
Subjective Happiness of 6.5 (Very Happy)
42

Subjective Happiness is 5.05 (Average Happiness)

Consumption Per Day ($)

Subjective Happiness is 3 (Unhappy)
40

38

Initial Conditions:
Initial Capital Stock: $1000
Time Frame: 30 days
Daily Interest Rate: 1%

36

34

32
0

5

10

15
Time (Days)

20

25

30

56
HAPPINESS AND TEMPORAL DISCOUNTING
As stated, one could extend this analysis to consumption of money over a
lifetime. If one were to do that, however, one would need to make additional
assumptions about income not related to initial capital. Because this study solely collects
data on college students, making inferences about discounting over one’s life is an
extrapolation. One could also apply this analysis with a greater spread of activities, each
of which have different weighted utility curves to add complexity and depth to the
interpretations. One cannot, however, apply this analysis to the quasi-hyperbolic
function. Because the quasi-hyperbolic function is piecewise and therefore not
continuous, the model violates the assumptions of the process outlined by Silberberg
(1978). If one eliminates the piecewise component to the quasi-hyperbolic function, the
consumption pattern is the exact same form as the discounted utility model, as the
immediate discounting component disappears. Consequently, to consider the quasihyperbolic model results further, I would need to use a dynamic programming
approach, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
Limitations and Future Research
There are limitations to this research. First, discount rates may not be a perfect
measure of impulsiveness. Although temporal discounting tendencies offer a general
model of impulsiveness, an individual will have different discount rates for different
goods, suggesting that strict dollar values are not a perfect predictor (Dittmar & Bond,
2010). Thus, making the connection between making impulsive decisions and happiness
may be slightly off base.
Similarly, there is the possibility that hypothetical rewards do not function as a
valid proxy for real rewards. Research by Johnson and Bickel (2002) suggest that people
do not differ between real and hypothetical rewards, the research does not have
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participant under emotional duress. Furthermore, non-monetary rewards might
fluctuate in different ways in real versus hypothetical situations, which could cause an
inconsistency between the findings and reality. It may be difficult for participants to
consider hypothetical dollar amounts as a coping mechanism for present emotion.
Another limitation of the study is the inability to assess whether the directionality
of the causation (if there is one) between happiness and temporal discounting. Because
the data are only correlation, a causal claim cannot be made. The only way to truly
identify whether or not temporal discounting affects happiness would be to coach
someone to manipulate their discount rates and then track their happiness over time
and compare that to a control group.
There is also limitation associated with the sample; using only Intro to
Psychology students at one college will certainly lead to a biased sample. People in this
demographic may have certain traits that limit the extent to which the findings are true.
Any participants may also have a difficult time making temporal discounting decisions
about abstract ideas such as happiness. Furthermore, participants may suffer from
fatigue in the survey, and produce bias results because of their fatigue. Research by
Brazell, Gray-Lee, Louviere, Dallaert, and Pullman (1995) indicated this effect may be
minimal, as participants may actually “learn” over the course of the experiment, and
become more efficient at the decision making. Furthermore, Louviere (1997) found
similar discount rates for respondents answering between 12, 24, 48, or 96 questions.
However, the abstract nature of this experiment may cause problems.
A bigger potential problem with the study is the overall lack of unhappy
participants. Figure 1 illustrates than that the large majority rated themselves as being
happy, with very few students on the low end of the spectrum. Without having an
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adequate sample of unhappy participants, obtaining an overall trend in discounting as
happiness varies proves difficult. This restriction of range bias could be solved by
obtaining a larger, more diverse sample of participants to include more unhappy people
in the study. Additionally, although I collected no demographic information, the sample
was likely very homogenous. Based on the population from which I drew the sample, the
participants were aged 18-22, with the majority being at the lower end of that spectrum.
Furthermore, they were likely white, middle- to upper-middle class citizens and fairly
intelligent. Without the full spectrum of diversity, making broad claims is extrapolating
beyond what the sample allows.
Future research could be done in many areas. One could see if one could instill
certain mindsets or philosophies that emphasize either present or future-oriented
thinking, and the implications on temporal discounting, similar to what Mogilner,
Aaker, Kamvar did with tea and excitedness (2012).
A mirror study could be done with punishments as opposed to rewards; instead
of posing “Would you rather receive $100 today or $120 in a week?” one could ask
“Would you rather pay off a debt with $100 today or $120 in a week?” and “Would you
rather be sad for the next 3 days or 5 days next week?” Studies have shown people to
have loss aversion, and that may have an effect on discount rates (Tversky & Kahneman,
1991). This could confirm and extend or limit the scope of the current study.
Additionally, research could be done exploring a different set of time periods than used
in this study. With longer time horizons, one could more accurately assess long term
discounting tendencies.
Research could also analyze other intrapersonal characteristics that vary with
discount tendencies. There may be personality traits, demographic differences, or other
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variations between people that affects how individuals discount the future. If this
information is found, then one could potentially control for these factors and determine
a more comprehensive model of temporal discounting.
Finally, one could test temporal discount rates at the macro level and the mood of
nations. One could analyze different policies that value future generations at different
rates and compare those to the political and overall mood of a country or state at a given
time to see if the effects of individual temporal discounting persist at higher ordered
groups. A country, in theory, should make more future oriented decisions when the
mood in the country is high, because the economy is likely doing well and thus could
afford to make future-oriented decisions. However, the results of this study may suggest
that the citizens may try to maintain the current mood, and have a high discount rate
even when morale is high.
Conclusions
Overall, almost all the tested hypotheses gave inconclusive results. The main
problem likely is usage of a poor discounting elicitation method. Nonetheless,
examining the results, as well as their implications has value. If happiness is negatively
correlated with discounting, that means by adding it to previously existing discounting
models, researchers can more accurately predict behavior if one’s happiness is known.
Furthermore, the connection between happiness and discounting may go a long way in
terms of explaining differences in life outcomes between individuals. Although I do not
have the evidence to suggest a causal relationship between happiness and discounting,
there is an intuitive connection in each direction; happier people do not need the
immediate boost in morale as badly as unhappy people, and thus discount less, or the
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converse, people who tend to discount less have better life outcomes and are thus
happier.
Additionally, how people respond to information greatly impacts policy decisions.
If people do not incorporate information about the effects of discounting into their
decisions, people may achieve suboptimal outcomes. In those cases, individuals or
policy makers can implement systems to shift people’s behavior closer to what is
considered ideal. Social workers and well-being assistants could also help their clients
more by knowing this research. If a social worker has a depressed client, the social
worker may be able to better help the person if they know what types of poor decisions
the client is likely to make because the person is unhappy. Thus, beyond strictly mental
strategies, caretakers could encourage healthy lifestyle choices, such as eating right and
saving, both because the client may be unlikely to engage in those activities
autonomously, and that lowering one’s discount rate may actually lead to more
happiness down the line. Furthermore, consideration of how those ideals reflect back
onto happiness should be a driving force in the discussion.
As stated, many consider happiness to be a premiere force in life, if not the
ultimate force. Because so much of what people do is connected to the pursuit of
happiness, understanding the connection between well-being and decision making is of
the utmost importance: do people make decisions that are likely to make them happy?
Do happy people make decisions differently than unhappy people? Are people aware of
how to become happier and live better? Because of the prominent role intertemporal
choice plays in our lives, the connection between happiness and temporal decision
making should be fully understood.
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Appendix A
For each of the following statements and/or questions, please circle the point on the
scale that you feel is most appropriate in describing you.
1. In general, I consider myself:
not a very happy person
happy person

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

a very

2. Compared with most of my peers, I consider myself:
less happy 1

2

3

4

5

6

7 more happy

3. Some people are generally very happy. They enjoy life regardless of what is going on,
getting the most out of everything. To what extent does this characterization describe
you?
not at all 1

2

3

4

5

6

7 a great deal

4. Some people are generally not very happy. Although they are not depressed, they
never seem as happy as they might be. To what extent does this characterization
describe you?
not at all 1

2

3

4

5

6

7 a great deal
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Appendix B

COLLEGE OF ST. BENEDICT/ST.
JOHN’S UNIVERSITY Temporal
Discounting and Happiness
INTRODUCTION
You are invited to be in a research study about time preferences. This study is being conducted by: Daniel Flesher, under the
supervision of Dr. Rodger Narloch and Dr. Parker Wheatley. You were selected as a possible participant because of your
expressed interest in the study via the PRIA system. We ask that you read this form and ask any questions you may have before
agreeing to be in the study.
BACKGROUND and PROCEDURES
The purpose of this study is explore the relationship between individuals’ preferences for rewards over different periods in time,
and the factors that affect an individual's preferences.
If you agree to be in this study, we would ask you to do the following things.
Take a four question survey regarding your personal happiness. Complete a thirty item exercise indicating your preferences
over time. Read one short article. Complete another thirty item exercise indicating time preference. Write a short response
regarding the task you performed.
RISKS/BENEFITS
This study has no known risks.
The benefits of participation are a potentially deeper understanding of how you make decisions regarding time.
CONFIDENTIALITY
The specific data connected with this study will be completely anonymous, and your answers will not be able to be tied back to
your identity. The study does not require you to provide any identifying information. The records of this study will be kept private.
Research records will be kept in a secure file on a password protected computer. Only the researchers will have access to the
records. In any reports or public presentations, no information will be included that would make it possible to identify a
participant.
VOLUNTARY NATURE OF THE STUDY
Your participation in this research study is completely voluntary. You may stop participating at any time without penalty or costs
of any kind. Your decision whether or not to participate will not affect your current or future relations with the College of Saint
Benedict or Saint John’s University.

CONTACTS AND QUESTIONS
The researchers conducting this study are Daniel Flesher, under supervision of Dr. Rodger Narloch and Dr. Parker Wheatley. You
may ask any questions you have now. If you have questions later, you may contact them at: Daniel Flesher –
daflesher@csbsju.edu, (952)-250-0744. Dr. Rodger Narloch – rnarloch@csbsju.edu, Dr. Parker Wheatley – pwheatley@csbsju.edu.
If you have additional questions you may also contact the CSB/SJU Institutional Review board chair, Dr. Robert Kachelski:
irb@csbsju.edu ].
You will be given a copy of this form to keep for your records.
STATEMENT OF CONSENT
I have read the above information. I have asked questions and have received answers. I consent to participate in the research.
I attest that:
• I am at least 18 years of age.
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For each of the following statements and/or questions, please indicate the number on the scale that you feel is most appropriate in describing you.

1. 1. In general, I consider myself:
Selection

person (1)
Not a happy
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person (7)
A very happy

n
m
j
k
l

2. Compared with most of my peers, I consider myself:
Selection

Less happy (1)
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3. Some people are generally very happy. They enjoy life regardless of what is going
on, getting the most out of everything. To what extent does this characterization
describe you?
Selection

Not at all (1)
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A great deal (7)
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4. Some people are generally not very happy. Although they are not depressed, they never
seem as happy as they might be. To what extent does this characterization describe you?
Selection

Not at all (1)
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A great deal (7)
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The purpose of the following study is to compare your preferences for different amounts of money and periods of happiness over different periods of
time. In this experiment, you will be asked to make assessments about the minimum amount of either money or period of happiness you would
accept in the future in exchange for the provided amount in the today. For example, if the question prompts, “How much is the minimum you
would accept instead of $X today?” you would answer with $Y, where Y is the lowest amount you would accept today instead of taking the money
in the future. Similarly, a question may prompt, “How much is the minimum number of days you would accept in 6 months instead of X days
starting today?” you would answer with Y days, where Y is the fewest number of days of happiness you would accept starting at the given point in
the future instead of the number of days today. Use decimals and non-round numbers when appropriate.
For the questions regarding periods happiness, define happiness however you define being happy. In other words, use whatever happiness means
to you.
These first four are practice problems, and will not be used in the data, but are simply to give you an opportunity to familiarize yourself with the
task.
The following questions measure a personal preference, and therefore there is no incorrect answer.

5. How much is the minimum in dollars you would accept in ten weeks instead of $45
today?
Amount in dollars in ten
weeks:

6. How much is the minimum in dollars you would accept in two weeks for $700 today?
Amount in dollars in two
weeks:

7. How many days of happiness is the minimum you would accept in 20 days instead of 90
days of happiness starting today?
Amount you would accept in
20 days:

8. How many days of happiness is the minimum you would accept in seven months
instead of 8 days of happiness starting today?
Amount you would accept in
seven months:
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The following responses will be used in data collection. Please consider your answers carefully.
Remember, the following questions measure personal preference. There are no incorrect answers.

9. What is the minimum amount in dollars you would accept in three days instead of $275
today?
Amount in dollars you would
accept in three days:

10. What is the minimum amount in dollars you would accept in one week instead of $820
today?
Amount in dollars you would
accept in one week:

11. What is the minimum amount in dollars you would accept in ten days instead of $10
today?
Amount in dollars you would
accept in ten days:

12. What is the minimum amount in dollars you would accept in two weeks instead of $650
today?
Amount in dollars you would
accept in two weeks:

13. What is the minimum amount in dollars you would accept in one month instead of $350
today?
Amount in dollars you would
accept in one month:

14. What is the minimum amount in dollars you would accept in six weeks instead of $220
today?
Amount in dollars you would
accept in six weeks:

15. What is the minimum amount in dollars you would accept in two months instead of
$100 today?
Amount in dollars you would
accept in two months:

16. What is the minimum amount in dollars you would accept in three months instead of
$40 today?
Amount in dollars you would
accept in three months:

72
HAPPINESS AND TEMPORAL DISCOUNTING
17. What is the minimum amount in dollars you would accept in four months instead of
$1000 today?
Amount in dollars you would
accept in four months:

18. What is the minimum amount in dollars you would accept in six months instead of $500
today?
Amount in dollars you would
accept in six months:

19. What is the minimum amount in dollars you would accept in eight months instead of
$80 today?
Amount in dollars you would
accept in eight months:

20. What is the minimum amount in dollars you would accept in nine months instead of
$50 today?
Amount in dollars you would
accept in nine months:

21. What is the minimum amount in dollars you would accept in twelve months instead of
$175 today?
Amount in dollars you would
accept in twelve months:

22. What is the minimum amount in dollars you would accept in eighteen months instead
of $25 today?
Amount in dollars you would
accept in eighteen months:

23. What is the minimum amount in dollars you would accept in twenty-four months
instead of $400 today?
Amount in dollars you would
accept in twenty-four
months:
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For the questions regarding periods happiness, define happiness however you define being happy. In other words, use whatever happiness means
to you.
Remember, the following questions measure personal preference. There are no incorrect answers.

24. How many days of happiness is the minimum you would accept in three days instead
of 40 days starting today?
Number of days of
happiness you would accept
in three days:

25. How many days of happiness is the minimum you would accept in one week instead of
20 days starting today?
Number of days of
happiness you would accept
in one week:

26. How many days of happiness is the minimum you would accept in ten days instead of
65 days starting today?
Number of days of
happiness you would accept
in ten days:

27. How many days of happiness is the minimum you would accept in two weeks instead
of 100 days starting today?
Number of days of
happiness you would accept
in two weeks:

28. How many days of happiness is the minimum you would accept in one month instead
of 80 days starting today?
Number of days of
happiness you would accept
in one month:

29. How many days of happiness is the minimum you would accept in six weeks instead of
25 days starting today?
Number of days of
happiness you would accept
in six weeks:

30. How many days of happiness is the minimum you would accept in two months instead
of 365 days starting today?
Number of days of
happiness you would accept
in two months:
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31. How many days of happiness is the minimum you would accept in three months
instead of 7 days starting today?
Number of days of
happiness you would accept
in three months:

32. How many days of happiness is the minimum you would accept in four months instead
of 300 days starting today?
Number of days of
happiness you would accept
in four months:

33. How many days of happiness is the minimum you would accept in six months instead
of 50 days starting today?
Number of days of
happiness you would accept
in six months:

34. How many days of happiness is the minimum you would accept in eight months
instead of 35 days starting today?
Number of days of
happiness you would accept
in eight months:

35. How many days of happiness is the minimum you would accept in nine months
instead of 200 days starting today?
Number of days of
happiness you would accept
in nine months:

36. How many days of happiness is the minimum you would accept in twelve months
instead of 5 days starting today?
Number of days of
happiness you would accept
in twelve months:

37. How many days of happiness is the minimum you would accept in eighteen months
instead of 15 days starting today?
Number of days of
happiness you would accept
in eighteen months:

38. How many days of happiness is the minimum you would accept in twenty-four months
instead of 150 days starting today?
Number of days of
happiness you would accept
in twenty-four months:
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Read the article on the next page. Note: You will be given a brief quiz on the material you read.
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The concept of the delay of gratification has been long studied in psychology and economics. Delaying gratification is the process of forgoing
small, immediate rewards in exchange for larger rewards in the future. One of the foundational delay of gratification studies was done in the 1960’s
and 1970’s by Dr. Walter Mischel. In these studies, children were offered either one marshmallow immediately, or two marshmallows in fifteen
minutes if the child could resist the temptation to eat single marshmallow now. Some children were able to wait for the two marshmallows, but
many ate the marshmallow presented to them immediately. Longitudinal studies later found that those children who waited for the larger rewards
tended to do better in the future – they earned higher SAT scores and received more education.
Similar studies have connected one’s ability to delay gratification a variety of other life outcomes. People who are less able to delay gratification
are more likely to drive drunk, be addicted to drugs, gamble, or be obese. These results all suggest that people who delay less are more impulsive,
and thus tend to make decisions associated with being impulsive (overeating, engaging in drug use, etc.)
Furthermore, people who are able to delay longer (i.e. wait more for rewards) tend to be better off overall by several objective measures. Those
who wait for the larger rewards tend to save more for retirement. Additionally, those that wait for gratification in the future procrastinate less, and
thus tend to be more productive. Finally, studies have shown a positive correlation between one’s ability to wait for rewards in the future and overall
happiness. This means that people who delay gratification are more likely to be happy. With such high-impact consequences of delaying
gratification, understanding the mental processes behind the delay of gratification may be able to significantly benefit one’s life.

*39. In a few sentences, please explain how, in your opinion, being able to delay

gratification is important.
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Classical conditioning theory involves learning a new behavior via the process of association. In simple terms two stimuli are linked together to
produce a new learned response in a person or animal.
For example, Little Albert was a 9-month-old infant who was tested on his reactions to various stimuli. He was shown a white rat, a rabbit, a monkey
and various masks. Albert was described as "on the whole stolid and unemotional," and showed no fear of any of these stimuli. However what did
startle him and cause him to be afraid was a hammer being struck against a steel bar behind his head. The sudden loud noise would cause Little
Albert to burst into tears.
When Little Albert was just over 11 months old the white rat was presented and seconds later the hammer was struck against the steel bar. This was
done 7 times over the next 7 weeks and each time Little Albert burst into tears. Eventually, Little Albert only had to see the rat and he immediately
showed every sign of fear. He would cry (whether or not the hammer was hit against the steel bar) and he would attempt to crawl away whenever
the rat was presented.
Watson and Rayner had shown that classical conditioning could be used to create a phobia. A phobia is an irrational fear, i.e. a fear that is out of
proportion to the danger. Over the next few weeks and months Little Albert was observed and 10 days after conditioning his fear of the rat was
much less marked. This dying out of a learned response is called extinction. However even after a full month the phobia was still evident.

*40. In a few sentences, please explain how Little Albert developed a phobia to a white

rat.
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For this portion of experiment, we are going to again give you a series of different rewards, and you will again give the minimum value you would
accept today in exchange for the reward in the future. Please consider your answers carefully.
Remember, the following questions measure personal preference. There are no incorrect answers.

41. What is the minimum amount in dollars you would accept in three days instead of $80
today?
Amount in dollars you would
accept in three days:

42. What is the minimum amount in dollars you would accept in one week instead of $275
today?
Amount in dollars you would
accept in one week:

43. What is the minimum amount in dollars you would accept in ten days instead of $820
today?
Amount in dollars you would
accept in ten days:

44. What is the minimum amount in dollars you would accept in two weeks instead of $10
today?
Amount in dollars you would
accept in two weeks:

45. What is the minimum amount in dollars you would accept in one month instead of $650
today?
Amount in dollars you would
accept in one month:

46. What is the minimum amount in dollars you would accept in six weeks instead of $175
today?
Amount in dollars you would
accept in six weeks:

47. What is the minimum amount in dollars you would accept in two months instead of
$350 today?
Amount in dollars you would
accept in two months:

48. What is the minimum amount in dollars you would accept in three months instead of
$1000 today?
Amount in dollars you would
accept in three months:
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49. What is the minimum amount in dollars you would accept in four months instead of $80
today?
Amount in dollars you would
accept in four months:

50. What is the minimum amount in dollars you would accept in six months instead of $220
today?
Amount in dollars you would
accept in six months:

51. What is the minimum amount in dollars you would accept in eight months instead of
$50 today?
Amount in dollars you would
accept in eight months:

52. What is the minimum amount in dollars you would accept in nine months instead of
$25 today?
Amount you in dollars would
accept in nine months:

53. What is the minimum amount in dollars you would accept in twelve months instead of
$500 today?
Amount in dollars you would
accept in twelve months:

54. What is the minimum amount in dollars you would accept in eighteen months instead
of $400 today?
Amount in dollars you would
accept in eighteen months:

55. What is the minimum amount in dollars you would accept in twenty-four months
instead of $100 today?
Amount in dollars you would
accept in twenty-four
months:
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For the questions regarding periods happiness, define happiness however you define being happy. In other words, use whatever happiness means
to you.
Remember, the following questions measure personal preference. There are no incorrect answers.

56. How many days of happiness is the minimum you would accept in three days instead
of 20 days starting today?
Number of days of
happiness you would accept
in three days:

57. How many days of happiness is the minimum you would accept in one week instead of
80 days starting today?
Number of days of
happiness you would accept
in one week:

58. How many days of happiness is the minimum you would accept in ten days instead of
300 days starting today?
Number of days of
happiness you would accept
in ten days:

59. How many days of happiness is the minimum you would accept in two weeks instead
of 7 days starting today?
Number of days of
happiness you would accept
in two weeks:

60. How many days of happiness is the minimum you would accept in one month instead
of 15 days starting today?
Number of days of
happiness you would accept
in one month:

61. How many days of happiness is the minimum you would accept in six weeks instead of
40 days starting today?
Number of days of
happiness you would accept
in six weeks:

62. How many days of happiness is the minimum you would accept in two months instead
of 200 days starting today?
Number of days of
happiness you would accept
in two months:
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63. How many days of happiness is the minimum you would accept in three months
instead of 50 days starting today?
Number of days of
happiness you would accept
in three months:

64. How many days of happiness is the minimum you would accept in four months instead
of 365 days starting today?
Number of days of
happiness you would accept
in four months:

65. How many days of happiness is the minimum you would accept in six months instead
of 25 days starting today?
Number of days of
happiness you would accept
starting in six months:

66. How many days of happiness is the minimum you would accept in eight months
instead of 35 days starting today?
Number of days of
happiness you would accept
in eight months:

67. How many days of happiness is the minimum you would accept in nine months
instead of 150 days starting today?
Number of days of
happiness you would accept
in nine months:

68. How many days of happiness is the minimum you would accept in twelve months
instead of 5 days starting today?
Number of days of
happiness you would accept
in twelve months:

69. How many days of happiness is the minimum you would accept in eighteen months
instead of 100 days starting today?
Number of days of
happiness you would accept
in eighteen months:

70. How many days of happiness is the minimum you would accept in twenty-four months
instead of 65 days starting today?
Number of days of
happiness you would accept
in twenty-four months:
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*71. Briefly describe the decision making process in which you engaged. How did you

make your decisions?
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72. For this research, your responses will not be connected with your identity. However,
the researchers still request permission to use and quote your responses in reports,
presentations, and in other academic settings. Again, your responses are completely
anonymous.
Please indicate whether or not the researchers have permission to use your responses in
future reports, presentations, and other academic settings.
j The researchers HAVE MY PERMISSION to use my responses.
l
m

j The researchers DO NOT HAVE MY PERMISSION to use my responses.
l
m
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Debriefing
Thank you very much for participating in this study!
The purpose of this study is measure individuals’ tendencies for preferring different rewards over time. These results will be
compared to how participants respond to questions about their happiness, as well as to the article that the participant read.
All participants are completing the same time preference & happiness survey you did. However, the article that you read may be
different than other participants. One article, which was read by half the students, focuses on the importance of delaying
gratification, and the repercussions delaying gratification has on one’s life. The other article, read by the other half of participants,
focuses on an example of Pavlovian conditioning.
We, the researchers, are looking at several different components in this study. We want to see if people’s reported happiness
correlates with their time preference tendencies. There is evidence to suggest that happier people will tend to accept less in the
future than less happy people. Secondly, we want to test how people prefer money over time compared to periods of happiness
over time. Previous research indicates consumable goods, such as candy or vacations, are preferred more immediately than
money. Finally, we want to test if knowing the effects of delaying gratification affects how one makes choices over time. There is
evidence to indicate that being informed of the importance of delaying gratification does not have much effect.
Because we won't be done with this experiment for several months, it is very important that you don't discuss it with any other
students. Many of them will be participating, and any information they have about the study might contaminate the results.
Therefore, please don't talk to anyone about this study!
Thank you, and please let us know if you have any questions or concerns about this research.
Daniel Flesher
daflesher@csbsju.edu
Dr. Rodger Narloch
rnarloch@csbsju.edu Dr.
Parker Wheatley
pwheatley@csbsju.edu
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Appendix C
𝑇

Maximize ∫0 𝑈(𝐶(𝑡))𝑚𝑡 𝑑𝑡 such that 𝑖𝐾 − 𝐶 = 𝐾 ′ where T is the total number of time
periods over which one is maximizing, t is time, C is consumption, U is utility, m is the
1
discounting factor 1+𝑟, i is the market interest rate, K is the amount of capital and K’ is
the rate of change of capital.

Using the Hamiltonian function:
𝐻(𝑡) = 𝑈(𝐶(𝑡))𝑚𝑡 + (𝑖𝐾 − 𝐶)
Take the derivative of the Hamiltonian with respect to consumption and set equal to
zero, and derivative of the Hamiltonian with respect to K and set equal to -’.
𝜕𝐻
= 𝑈 ′ (𝐶)𝑚𝑡 −  = 0 → 𝑈 ′ (𝐶)𝑚𝑡 =  Appendix Equation (A.E.) 1
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝐻
=  𝑖 = − ′ → − 𝑖 =  ′
𝜕𝐾

A.E. 2

Take the derivative of A.E. 1 with respect to t.
𝜕
= 𝑈 ′ (𝐶(𝑡))𝑚𝑡 ln(𝑚) + 𝑈 ′′ (𝐶(𝑡))𝐶 ′ 𝑚𝑡
𝜕𝑡

A. E. 3

Divide A.E.3 by A.E. 1
𝜕
′
𝑡
′′
′ 𝑡
′′
′
𝜕𝑡 = 𝑈 (𝐶(𝑡))𝑚 ln(𝑚) + 𝑈 (𝐶(𝑡))𝐶 𝑚 = ln(𝑚) + 𝑈 (𝐶(𝑡))𝐶 = ′

𝑈 ′ (𝐶)𝑚𝑡
𝑈 ′ (𝐶)

From A.E. 2,

′


A. E. 4

= −𝑖 and thus the LHS of A.E. 2 and the RHS of A.E. 4 are equivalent,

and thus the RHS of A.E. 2 and the LHS of A.E. 4 can be set equal to each other
−𝑖 = ln(𝑚) +

𝑈 ′′ (𝐶(𝑡))𝐶 ′
𝑈 ′′ (𝐶(𝑡))𝐶 ′
→
−
= 𝑖 + ln(𝑚)
𝑈 ′ (𝐶)
𝑈 ′ (𝐶)

A.E. 5

From A.E.2, −𝑖 = ′, solving the first order differential equation with respect to t gives
(𝑡) = 0 𝑒 −𝑖𝑡 . Plugging the RHS of this function into the RHS of A.E. 1 gives:
𝑈 ′ (𝐶)𝑚𝑡 = 0 𝑒 −𝑖𝑡 → 𝑈 ′ (𝐶) =

0 𝑒 −𝑖𝑡
𝑚𝑡

In order to exhibit the laws of diminishing marginal consumption
1

1

Let 𝑈(𝐶) = ln(𝐶) . Thus, 𝑈 ′ (𝐶) = 𝐶 , 𝑈 ′′ (𝐶) = − 𝐶 2

A.E. 6
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Plugging the above components into the LHS of A.E. 5 gives
1
𝐶′ 𝐶′
− (− 2 ) ∗
=
= 𝑖 + ln(𝑚)
1
𝐶
𝐶
𝐶

A.E. 7

Solve the first order differential equation in A.E. 7
𝐶′
= 𝑖 + ln(𝑚) → 𝐶 ′ = 𝐶(𝑖 + ln(𝑚))
𝐶

A.E.8

𝐶(𝑡) = 𝐶0 𝑒 (𝑖+ln(𝑚))𝑡 = 𝐶0 𝑒 𝑖𝑡 𝑒 ln(𝑚)𝑡 = 𝐶0 𝑒 𝑖𝑡 𝑚𝑡

A.E. 9

From the initial conditions of the maximization problem,
𝐾 ′ − 𝑖𝐾 = −𝐶
Plugging the LHS of A.E. 10 into the LHS of A.E. 9 gives

A.E. 10
A.E.11

𝐾 ′ − 𝑖𝐾 = −𝐶0 𝑒 𝑖𝑡 𝑚𝑡
Solve the differential equation via the integration factor
𝑒 ∫ −𝑖 𝑑𝑡 (𝐾 ′ − 𝑖𝐾) = (𝑒 ∫ −𝑖 𝑑𝑡 )(−𝐶0 𝑒 𝑖𝑡 𝑚𝑡 )
𝑑 ∫ −𝑖 𝑑𝑡
(𝑒
𝐾) = (𝑒 −𝑖𝑡 )(−𝐶0 𝑒 𝑖𝑡 𝑚𝑡 )
𝑑𝑡
∫

𝑑 ∫ −𝑖 𝑑𝑡
(𝑒
𝐾) = ∫ −𝐶0 𝑚𝑡
𝑑𝑡
𝑒 −𝑖𝑡 𝐾 = −
𝐾=−

𝐶0 𝑚𝑡
+𝐴
ln(𝑚)

A.E. 12

𝐶0 𝑚𝑡 𝑒 𝑖𝑡
+ 𝐴𝑒 𝑖𝑡
ln(𝑚)

At time t=0, K(0)=K0
𝐶0 𝑚0 𝑒 𝑖∗0
𝐶0
𝐾0= −
+ 𝐴𝑒 𝑖∗0 = −
+𝐴
ln(𝑚)
ln(𝑚)
𝐴 = 𝐾0 +

𝐶0
ln(𝑚)

Plugging the RHS of A.E. 14 in for A in Equation L gives:
𝐾(𝑡) = −
At time T, K(T) = 0.

𝐶0 𝑚𝑡 𝑒 𝑖𝑡
𝐶0
+ (𝐾0 +
) 𝑒 𝑖𝑡
ln(𝑚)
ln(𝑚)

A.E. 13

A.E. 14
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𝐶0 𝑚𝑇 𝑒 𝑖𝑇
𝐶0
−𝐶0 𝑚𝑇 𝑒 𝑖𝑇
𝐶0
𝑖𝑇
𝑖𝑇
𝐾(𝑇) = 0 = −
+ (𝐾0 +
)𝑒 = 𝑒 (
+ 𝐾0 +
)=0
ln(𝑚)
ln(𝑚)
ln(𝑚)
ln(𝑚)
Solve for C0.
−𝐶0 𝑚𝑇 𝑒 𝑖𝑇
𝐶0
+ 𝐾0 +
=0
ln(𝑚)
ln(𝑚)
−𝐾0 =

−𝐶0 𝑚𝑇 𝑒 𝑖𝑇
𝐶0
𝐶0
(−𝑚𝑇 + 1)
+
=
ln(𝑚)
ln(𝑚) ln(𝑚)
𝐶0 = −

𝐾0 ln(𝑚)
1 − 𝑚𝑇

A.E. 15

Plug the RHS of A.E. 15into A.E. 9 for C0.
𝐾0 ln(𝑚) 𝑒 𝑖𝑡 𝑚𝑡
𝐶(𝑡) = −
1 − 𝑚𝑇

A.E. 16

C(t) gives the optimal consumption at time t, given the parameters in the equation.
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Indifferences Points for Various Discounting Functions versus $100 today
Money
Time
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
30
35
40
50
60
70
80
90
100

Standard
100
102.30
104.65
107.06
109.52
112.03
114.61
117.24
119.94
122.70
125.52
128.40
131.35
134.37
137.46
140.62
143.86
147.16
150.54
154.01
157.55
161.17
164.87
168.66
172.54
176.51
197.75
221.54
248.21
311.54
391.04
490.82
616.06
773.26
970.58

Discounted Utility
SH = 6.5 SH = 5.05
100
100
102.13
102.28
104.30
104.61
106.52
107.00
108.78
109.44
111.10
111.94
113.46
114.49
115.87
117.10
118.33
119.78
120.85
122.51
123.42
125.30
126.05
128.16
128.73
131.09
131.46
134.08
134.26
137.13
137.12
140.26
140.03
143.46
143.01
146.74
146.05
150.08
149.16
153.51
152.33
157.01
155.57
160.59
158.88
164.25
162.26
168.00
165.71
171.83
169.23
175.75
188.01
196.74
208.87
220.22
232.04
246.52
286.39
308.89
353.47
387.05
436.25
484.98
538.43
607.70
664.54
761.46
820.19
954.14

SH = 3
100
102.60
105.27
108.01
110.81
113.70
116.65
119.68
122.80
125.99
129.27
132.63
136.08
139.61
143.24
146.97
150.79
154.71
158.73
162.86
167.10
171.44
175.90
180.47
185.17
189.98
216.00
245.58
279.21
360.93
466.56
603.10
779.61
1007.77
1302.70

Standard
100
181.15
181.67
182.20
182.72
183.25
183.78
184.31
184.85
185.38
185.92
186.45
186.99
187.53
188.08
188.62
189.17
189.71
190.26
190.81
191.36
191.92
192.47
193.03
193.59
194.15
196.97
199.83
202.74
208.68
214.79
221.08
227.55
234.22
241.08

Quasi-Hyperbolic
SH = 6.5
SH = 5.05
100
100
177.13
180.73
177.65
181.26
178.16
181.78
178.67
182.31
179.19
182.83
179.71
183.36
180.23
183.89
180.75
184.42
181.27
184.96
181.80
185.49
182.32
186.03
182.85
186.56
183.38
187.10
183.91
187.64
184.44
188.19
184.97
188.73
185.51
189.28
186.04
189.82
186.58
190.37
187.12
190.92
187.66
191.48
188.20
192.03
188.75
192.58
189.29
193.14
189.84
193.70
192.60
196.52
195.40
199.37
198.24
202.27
204.05
208.20
210.03
214.29
216.18
220.57
222.51
227.03
229.03
233.68
235.74
240.53

SH = 3
100
188.64
189.19
189.73
190.28
190.83
191.38
191.94
192.49
193.05
193.61
194.17
194.73
195.29
195.86
196.42
196.99
197.56
198.13
198.70
199.28
199.85
200.43
201.01
201.59
202.18
205.11
208.10
211.12
217.31
223.67
230.22
236.97
243.91
251.05
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Indifferences Points for Various Discounting Functions versus 100 days starting today
Happiness
Time
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
30
35
40
50
60
70
80
90
100

Discounted Utility
Standard SH = 6.5
SH = 5.05
100.0
100.0
100.0
101.6
101.5
101.6
103.3
103.1
103.2
104.9
104.6
104.9
106.6
106.2
106.6
108.3
107.8
108.3
110.1
109.5
110.1
111.9
111.2
111.8
113.7
112.8
113.6
115.5
114.6
115.5
117.4
116.3
117.3
119.3
118.1
119.2
121.2
119.9
121.1
123.1
121.7
123.1
125.1
123.5
125.1
127.1
125.4
127.1
129.2
127.3
129.1
131.3
129.3
131.2
133.4
131.2
133.3
135.6
133.2
135.4
137.7
135.3
137.6
140.0
137.3
139.8
142.2
139.4
142.1
144.5
141.5
144.4
146.8
143.7
146.7
149.2
145.9
149.1
161.7
157.3
161.5
175.1
169.7
174.9
189.7
183.0
189.4
222.7
212.8
222.2
261.3
247.5
260.7
306.7
287.8
305.8
359.9
334.8
358.7
422.4
389.3
420.9
495.8
452.8
493.7

SH = 3
100.0
101.8
103.6
105.5
107.4
109.3
111.2
113.2
115.3
117.3
119.4
121.6
123.7
126.0
128.2
130.5
132.8
135.2
137.6
140.1
142.6
145.2
147.8
150.4
153.1
155.9
170.3
186.1
203.4
242.9
290.1
346.4
413.7
494.1
590.0

Quasi-Hyperbolic
Standard SH = 6.5 SH = 5.05
100.0
100.0
100.0
167.3
178.1
168.2
167.7
178.6
168.7
168.1
179.1
169.2
168.5
179.6
169.7
168.9
180.1
170.2
169.4
180.7
170.7
169.8
181.2
171.2
170.2
181.7
171.6
170.6
182.2
172.1
171.0
182.8
172.6
171.5
183.3
173.1
171.9
183.8
173.6
172.3
184.3
174.1
172.7
184.9
174.6
173.2
185.4
175.2
173.6
185.9
175.7
174.0
186.5
176.2
174.5
187.0
176.7
174.9
187.6
177.2
175.3
188.1
177.7
175.8
188.7
178.2
176.2
189.2
178.7
176.6
189.7
179.2
177.1
190.3
179.8
177.5
190.8
180.3
179.7
193.6
182.9
182.0
196.4
185.6
184.2
199.3
188.3
188.8
205.1
193.8
193.5
211.1
199.5
198.4
217.3
205.3
203.4
223.7
211.3
208.4
230.2
217.5
213.7
237.0
223.9

SH = 3
100.0
151.0
151.4
151.9
152.3
152.7
153.2
153.6
154.1
154.5
155.0
155.4
155.8
156.3
156.8
157.2
157.7
158.1
158.6
159.0
159.5
160.0
160.4
160.9
161.3
161.8
164.2
166.5
169.0
173.9
179.0
184.3
189.7
195.2
200.9
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Appendix E
Consumption at time t
Model Incorporating Happiness
t

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Elicited
Discounted
Utility Model
$
41.98
$
41.72
$
41.47
$
41.23
$
40.98
$
40.73
$
40.49
$
40.25
$
40.01
$
39.77
$
39.53
$
39.29
$
39.06
$
38.82
$
38.59
$
38.36
$
38.13
$
37.90
$
37.67
$
37.45
$
37.22
$
37.00
$
36.78
$
36.56
$
36.34
$
36.12
$
35.90
$
35.69
$
35.48
$
35.26

Subjective
Happiness of 6.5
(Very Happy)
$
41.45
$
41.24
$
41.03
$
40.82
$
40.62
$
40.41
$
40.20
$
40.00
$
39.79
$
39.59
$
39.39
$
39.19
$
38.99
$
38.79
$
38.59
$
38.40
$
38.20
$
38.01
$
37.82
$
37.62
$
37.43
$
37.24
$
37.05
$
36.86
$
36.67
$
36.49
$
36.30
$
36.12
$
35.93
$
35.75

Subjective
Happiness is 5.05
(Average Happiness)
$
41.95
$
41.70
$
41.45
$
41.21
$
40.96
$
40.72
$
40.48
$
40.24
$
40.00
$
39.76
$
39.52
$
39.29
$
39.05
$
38.82
$
38.59
$
38.36
$
38.13
$
37.90
$
37.68
$
37.46
$
37.23
$
37.01
$
36.79
$
36.57
$
36.35
$
36.14
$
35.92
$
35.71
$
35.50
$
35.29

Subjective
Happiness is 3
(Unhappy)
$
42.99
$
42.66
$
42.33
$
42.00
$
41.68
$
41.36
$
41.04
$
40.72
$
40.41
$
40.10
$
39.79
$
39.48
$
39.17
$
38.87
$
38.57
$
38.27
$
37.98
$
37.69
$
37.39
$
37.11
$
36.82
$
36.53
$
36.25
$
35.97
$
35.70
$
35.42
$
35.15
$
34.87
$
34.61
$
34.34

